University of Minnesota Law School
Scholarship Repository
Minnesota Law Review

2009

The Myth of Self-Regulation
Fred C. Zacharias

Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr
Part of the Law Commons
Recommended Citation
Zacharias, Fred C., "The Myth of Self-Regulation" (2009). Minnesota Law Review. 543.
https://scholarship.law.umn.edu/mlr/543

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the University of Minnesota Law School. It has been accepted for inclusion in Minnesota Law
Review collection by an authorized administrator of the Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact lenzx009@umn.edu.

Article

The Myth of Self-Regulation
Fred C. Zacharias†
Law in the United States is a heavily regulated industry.1
Lawyers are licensed in each state.2 They are governed by professional rules, usually adopted and enforced by state supreme
courts.3 The courts regulate lawyers separately as well,
† Herzog Research Professor, University of San Diego School of Law.
The author thanks Professor Steven D. Smith for his helpful comments on an
earlier draft of this article. Copyright © 2009 by Fred C. Zacharias.
1. James M. Fischer, External Control over the American Bar, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 59, 60 (2006) (“Today, law is a highly regulated industry . . . .”);
Mona L. Hymel, Controlling Lawyer Behavior: The Sources and Uses of Protocols in Governing Law Practice, 44 ARIZ. L. REV. 873, 874 (2002) (“[S]elfregulation [of lawyers] is becoming a smaller part of the regulatory mix.”);
John Leubsdorf, Legal Malpractice and Professional Responsibility, 48 RUTGERS L. REV. 101, 102 (1995) (“Increasingly, professional ideals have been
turned into enforceable law, and self-regulation by the organized bar has become regulation by courts and legislatures.”); Russell G. Pearce, The Professionalism Paradigm Shift: Why Discarding Professional Ideology Will Improve
the Conduct and Reputation of the Bar, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1229, 1275 (1995)
(noting that the existence of disciplinary regulation and substantial regulatory
law, including “tort law, criminal law, agency law, and securities law” belies
the notion that lawyers are self-regulating); Symposium, Twenty Years of Legal Ethics: Past, Present, and Future, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 321, 329
(2007) (reporting comments of Professor Stephen Gillers: “We are seeing more
of the rules governing lawyers coming out of the substantive law, in malpractice cases, interpretations of fiduciary duty, through agency law, and construction of the attorney-client privilege.”).
2. See, e.g., NAT’L CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS & AM. BAR ASS’N
SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE
TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 2007, at 3−5 (2007), available at
http://www.ncbex.org/fileadmin/mediafiles/downloads/Comp_Guide/2007Comp
Guide.pdf (cataloguing state licensing requirements); Larry E. Ribstein, Lawyers as Lawmakers: A Theory of Lawyer Licensing, 69 MO. L. REV. 299, 301
(2004) (presenting a “new rationale for state licensing of lawyers”); Randall T.
Shephard, On Licensing Lawyers: Why Uniformity is Good and Nationalization is Bad, 60 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 453, 460−61 (2004) (arguing in favor
of maintaining state-by-state licensing of lawyers).
3. See American Bar Association, Center for Prof ’l Responsibility, Links
to Other Legal Ethics and Professional Responsibility Pages, http://www
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through supervisory decisions in the course of litigation and by
implementing common law civil liability rules that govern legal
practice.4 These include malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty,
and other causes of action.5 Administrative agencies—
particularly federal agencies—also establish and implement
rules governing lawyers who practice before them.6 Federal and
state legislatures play a further role in regulating the bar, providing statutory regulations7 and criminal penalties that apply
to lawyers.8
Nevertheless, courts,9 commentators,10 and legal ethics
regulators11 continue to conceptualize law as a “self-regulated
.abanet.org/cpr/links.html (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (providing state-by-state
links to the governing legal ethics codes).
4. See Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Rationalizing Judicial Regulation of Lawyers, 70 OHIO ST. L.J. (forthcoming 2009) (discussing the relationship between the various forms of judicial regulation).
5. Id. (manuscript at 8, on file with author).
6. See generally Fred C. Zacharias, Understanding Recent Trends in Federal Regulation of Lawyers, PROF. LAW., 2003 Symposium Issue, at 16−22 (describing a range of administrative regulations of lawyers).
7. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (authorizing the SEC to promulgate standards of conduct for securities lawyers);
Heslin v. Conn. Law Clinic of Trantolo & Trantolo, 461 A.2d 938, 941 (Conn.
1983) (applying a consumer protection statute to a lawyer’s misleading advertising); Fischer, supra note 1, at 97−108 (discussing a variety of legislative
regulations of lawyer conduct); Shelley D. Gatlin, Note, Attorney Liability Under Deceptive Trade Practices Acts, 15 REV. LITIG. 397, 400 n.9 (1996) (cataloguing state consumer protection statutes applicable to lawyers). Arguably, insurers serve as regulators as well, but their requirements typically do not
have the force of law we normally attribute to “regulation.” See generally
Fischer, supra note 1, at 63−95 (illustrating the ways private insurers influence lawyer conduct).
8. See Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67 FORDHAM L. REV. 327, 330−52 (1998) (discussing the role of criminal law in regulating lawyers).
9. See, e.g., Guillen v. City of Chi., 956 F. Supp. 1416, 1424 (N.D. Ill.
1997) (discussing “the bar’s capacity for self-regulation”); McConchie v. WalMart Stores, Inc., 985 F. Supp. 273, 278 (N.D.N.Y. 1997) (relying on Wieder v.
Skala, 609 N.E.2d 105 (N.Y. 1992), for the proposition that the legal profession
is unique in its self-regulatory nature); Wolters Kluwer Fin. Servs. Inc. v. Scivantage, 525 F. Supp. 2d 448, 449 (S.D.N.Y 2007) (“While frequently under
fire, attorney behavior remains largely self-regulating.”); Averill v. Cox, 761
A.2d 1083, 1089 (N.H. 2000) (“We are aware that consumers in the legal marketplace may feel especially vulnerable to attorney misconduct because the
legal profession is self-regulated.”); State ex rel. Okla. Bar Ass’n v. Giger, 37
P.3d 856, 864 (Okla. 2001) (“The public must have confidence that the legal
profession, which is self-regulated, will not look the other way when its members break the law.”).
10. See, e.g., Jonathan Macey, Occupation Code 541110: Lawyers, SelfRegulation, and the Idea of a Profession, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 1079, 1081
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profession.” A Westlaw search reveals more than five hundred
law review articles that refer to the concept in the last ten
years alone.12 The preamble to the recently revised ABA Model
Rules of Professional Conduct maintains an emphasis on the
importance of self-regulation,13 presenting the Model Rules
themselves as a form of self-regulation despite the fact that the
Rules are intended to be adopted as enforceable law by state
supreme courts.14 The Preamble states:
The legal profession is largely self-governing. Although other professions also have been granted powers of self-government, the legal
profession is unique in this respect because of the close relationship
between the profession and the processes of government and law enforcement. . . .
To the extent that lawyers meet the obligations of their professional calling, the occasion for government regulation is obviated.
Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession’s independence from government domination. . . .
The legal profession’s relative autonomy carries with it special responsibilities of self-government. The profession has a responsibility
to assure that its regulations are conceived in the public interest and
not in furtherance of parochial or self-interested concerns of the bar.
Every lawyer is responsible for observance of the Rules of Professional Conduct. A lawyer should also aid in securing their observance by
other lawyers. Neglect of these responsibilities compromises the independence of the profession . . . .15
(2005) (arguing “against self-regulation of the legal profession”); Laurie A. Morin, Broken Trust and Divided Loyalties: The Paradox of Confidentiality in
Corporate Representation, 8 UDC/DCSL L. REV. 233, 233 n.1 (2004) (“Unlike
most professions, the legal profession in the United States is largely ‘selfregulating.’”); John P. Sahl, The Public Hazard of Lawyer Self-Regulation:
Learning from Ohio’s Struggle to Reform Its Disciplinary System, 68 U. CIN. L.
REV. 65, 72−73, 111 (1999) (discussing the “self-regulation” of judges and lawyers in the Ohio disciplinary process); Sandra Caron George, Comment, Prosecutorial Discretion: What’s Politics Got to Do with It?, 18 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 739, 745 (2005) (“The legal profession is by and large self-regulated.”).
11. See, e.g., Amendments to the Rules Regulating the Fla. Bar, 795 So.
2d 1, 35 (Fla. 2001) (per curiam) (comment to proposed rule 4−8.3, stating:
“Self-regulation of the legal profession requires that members of the profession
initiate disciplinary investigation when they know of a violation of the Rules of
Professional Conduct”); In re Application of Okla. Bar Ass’n to Amend Okla.
Rules of Prof ’l Conduct, 171 P.3d 780, 781 (Okla. 2007) (preamble to rules revision stating: “Self-regulation also helps maintain the legal profession's independence from government domination”).
12. A search for DATE(AFTER 1998) & ((lawyers “legal profession” bar)
/5 self-regulat!) in the Journals and Law Reviews database on March 11,
2009, yielded 542 documents.
13. MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 10 (2008).
14. Id. scope ¶ 19 (“Failure to comply with an obligation or prohibition
imposed by a Rule is a basis for invoking the disciplinary process.”).
15. Id. pmbl. ¶¶ 10−12.
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The observation that many forms of law constrain the conduct of lawyers is nothing new, and no one would seriously
question it.16 It is equally clear that, because lawyers participate heavily in producing the governing professional rules and
the broader external law that affects the bar, lawyers in some
respects are distinct among regulated professionals.17 Yet to
judge by the continuing references to lawyer self-regulation in
the commentary, many observers—among them the Model Rule
drafters—hearken nostalgically back to a notion that lawyers
are governed primarily through peer pressure, peer standards,
and peer discipline that elevate the bar and limit the need for
external regulation.18 Alternatively, the observers assume that
16. See Lawrence J. Fox, Dan’s World: A Free Enterprise Dream; An Ethics Nightmare, 55 BUS. LAW. 1533, 1549 (2000) (“[T]hat mantra of selfregulation recites what is largely a myth.”); Linda Fitts Mischler, Personal
Morals Masquerading as Professional Ethics: Regulations Banning Sex Between Domestic Relations Attorneys and Their Clients, 23 HARV. WOMEN’S L.J.
1, 93 (2000) (“Although the legal profession is often called a ‘self-regulating’
profession, this is a misnomer.”).
For a realistic assessment of the interrelationship between lawyer selfregulation (including professional discipline) and external constraints see Ted
Schneyer, From Self-Regulation to Bar Corporatism: What the S&L Crisis
Means for the Regulation of Lawyers, 35 S. TEX. L. REV. 639 (1994). Professor
Schneyer evaluates the practical explanations for why external regulation, including administrative regulation and civil lawsuits, targeted lawyers complicit in the savings and loan crisis of the 1980s while disciplinary regulation was
absent. Id. at 640−66. Schneyer then suggests that, in light of the practical
realities of regulation and banking practice, future professional regulation
needs to provide more detailed prophylactic protocols for the conduct of banking lawyers. Id. at 667. Such protocols would not, according to Schneyer, reflect “a major loss of influence for the profession,” but rather would illustrate
that bar organizations should operate “in tandem,” or as co-regulators, with
external overseers of lawyer conduct. Id. at 643.
17. Randy Lee, for example, emphasizes that, because judges are lawyers,
“judicial regulation of lawyers remains lawyers regulating lawyers.” Randy
Lee, The State of Self-Regulation of the Legal Profession: Have We Locked the
Fox in the Chicken Coop?, 11 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 69, 73 (2002). Benjamin Barton argues that, in promulgating professional codes, state supreme courts often are influenced—perhaps too heavily—by the proposals of the bar. Benjamin H. Barton, An Institutional Analysis of Lawyer Regulation: Who Should
Control Lawyer Regulation—Courts, Legislatures, or the Market?, 37 GA. L.
REV. 1167, 1186−88 (2003); see also Developments in the Law—Corporations &
Society, 117 HARV. L. REV. 2169, 2237 (2004) (“The legal profession has historically conceived of itself as independent and self-regulating, and local bar associations continue to influence the ethics rules that state courts of last resort
promulgate.”(footnote omitted)).
18. See, e.g., Kevin Hopkins, The Politics of Misconduct: Rethinking How
We Regulate Lawyer-Politicians, 57 RUTGERS L. REV. 839, 865−66 (2005) (“The
organized bar has contended that public confidence in lawyers is critical for
the proper functioning of the legal profession, and therefore, effective self-
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because the profession is self-regulated, the resulting behavioral norms and implementation of discipline are self-serving.19
regulation is necessary to preserve public faith in the integrity of the administration of justice and to maintain the profession’s reputation for trustworthiness.”); Susanna M. Kim, Dual Identities and Dueling Obligations: Preserving
Independence in Corporate Representation, 68 TENN. L. REV. 179, 255 (2001)
(“[L]awyers have the power of self-regulation. In comparison to all other professions, the legal profession is the most free of external governmental control.”); Karel Ourednik IV, Multidisciplinary Practice and Professional Responsibility After Enron, 4 FLA. COASTAL L.J. 167, 193 (2003) (“As a group that
self-regulates, lawyers must address [the post-Enron] issues, formulate policy,
and draft rules and regulations with effective enforcement.”); Kathleen M. Sullivan, The Good That Lawyers Do, 4 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 7, 21 (2000) (“Lawyers are self-regulated. . . . The price of professional autonomy and selfregulation is some duty of service.”); Christopher M. Von Maack, Civility in the
Practice of Law: A Young Lawyer’s Perspective, UTAH B.J., Nov./Dec. 2006, at
22 (“As a self-regulated profession . . . lawyers have an individual and collective role to play in maintaining civility in the practice of law.”); cf. Keith R.
Fisher, The Higher Calling: Regulation of Lawyers Post-Enron, 37 U. MICH.
J.L. REFORM 1017, 1025 (2004) (“The question is thus starkly posed: whether
the legal profession remains completely capable of self-regulation, of providing
legal services with honesty, integrity, and decorum, and of accepting fiduciary
responsibilities not merely to clients but to a broader definition of interests a
‘learned profession’ should serve.”); Deborah L. Rhode, Teaching Legal Ethics,
51 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 1043, 1056 (2007) (suggesting that legal ethics courses
should “remind future practitioners of the opportunities and obligations that
come with membership in a largely self-regulating profession”).
19. See RICHARD L. ABEL, AMERICAN LAWYERS 142 (1989) (“The content of
the ethical code and the nature of its enforcement both reflected jockeying
among lawyers for competitive advantage.”); David Barnhizer, Profession Deleted: Using Market and Liability Forces to Regulate the Very Ordinary Business of Law Practice for Profit, 17 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 203, 225 (2004)
(“There is a universal law that tells us no one is capable of fairly judging
themselves.”); Benjamin H. Barton, The ABA, the Rules, and Professionalism:
The Mechanics of Self-Defeat and a Call for a Return to the Ethical, Moral,
and Practical Approach of the Canons, 83 N.C. L. REV. 411, 419 (2005)
(“[B]ecause the legal profession is basically self-regulating, most regulations
governing lawyers are self-serving and aimed at increasing lawyer profits and
protecting the monopolistic nature of the legal profession.”); John C. Coffee,
Jr., The Attorney as Gatekeeper: An Agenda for the SEC, 103 COLUM. L. REV.
1293, 1316 (2003) (“[P]rivate self-regulation of attorneys through bar associations means the continued government of the guild, by the guild, and for the
guild.”); Anthony E. Davis, Professional Liability Insurers as Regulators of
Law Practice, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 209, 231 (1996) (“[T]he bar has proved itself to be supremely self-serving in regulating itself . . . .”); Brian Finkelstein,
Should Permanent Disbarment Be Permanent?, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 587,
594−95 (2007) (“The public perception that lawyers, members of a selfregulated profession, are merely ‘protecting themselves’ by not utilizing permanent disbarment, is a real threat to the reputation of all lawyers.”); Kay A.
Ostberg, The Conflict of Interest in Lawyer Self-Regulation, PROF. LAW.,
Summer 1989, at 6, 7 (characterizing the ABA and state bar associations as
“trade organizations charged with advancing the interests of lawyers” and
concluding that “[b]ecause trade associations do not represent the public, they
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The debates concerning proposed amendments to the professional rules routinely include statements that if lawyers do not
regulate themselves, external regulators will fill the vacuum.20
The debates also tend toward the position that foreclosing external regulation would be a good thing.21

should have . . . no role in deciding who enters the profession or in deciding
conflicts between its own members and the public”); cf. Debra Lyn Bassett,
Redefining the “Public” Profession, 36 RUTGERS L.J. 721, 724 (2005) (“With
scandals come calls for additional rules and regulations, typically accompanied
by criticism of the self-regulating nature of the legal profession as protectionism.”); Andrew M. Perlman, Toward a Unified Theory of Professional Regulation, 55 FLA. L. REV. 977, 993 (2003) (arguing that the bar’s professional
norms, in significant measure, have as their objective “the protection of the
bar’s economic well-being”).
20. See W. William Hodes, Truthfulness and Honesty Among American
Lawyers: Perception, Reality, and the Professional Reform Initiative, 53 S.C. L.
REV. 527, 537 (2002) (“Unless the organized bar cleans its own house, sooner or
later government agencies will remove the unique measure of self-regulation
granted to the legal profession . . . .”); Abraham C. Reich & Michelle T. Wirtner, What Do You Do When Confronted with Client Fraud?, BUS. L. TODAY,
Sept./Oct. 2002, at 39, 43 (“[L]awyers opposed to self-regulation beware: If the
profession fails to adequately police itself, our government will enact legislation that not only polices lawyers, but extends liability for corporate governance fiascos.”); Kenneth M. Rosen, Lessons on Lawyers, Democracy, and Professional Responsibility, 19 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 155, 167 (2006) (“Yet if
lawyers are unwilling to recommit themselves to the regulation of their profession and their responsibilities to society, one might expect additional [external] regulations . . . .”); cf. Lester Brickman, Effective Hourly Rates of Contingency-Fee Lawyers: Competing Data and Non-Competitive Fees, 81 WASH.
U. L.Q. 653, 699 (2003) (“The self-regulatory regime that the bar maintains
serves mostly to fend off other regulatory regimes.”); Morin, supra note 10, at
234 n.4 (“The legal profession has jealously guarded its self-regulatory status,
and I believe that the House of Delegates’ reversal of its long-standing position
in August 2003 was based as much on its fear of state regulation as on any
principled change of heart regarding client confidentiality.”); Ted Schneyer, An
Interpretation of Recent Developments in the Regulation of Law Practice, 30
OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 559, 569 (2005) (noting that “state supreme courts and
general-purpose bar associations do not consider ‘self-regulation’ moribund”
and citing instances in which they “continue, often with ABA support, to resist
federal ‘intrusions’”).
21. See Schneyer, supra note 20, at 583 (“The organized bar typically opposes legislative or administrative initiatives that enlist lawyers as gatekeepers . . . because the bar views the initiators as unwelcome ‘intruders’ on the
traditional turf of professional ‘self-regulation.’”); David B. Wilkins, Who
Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV. 799, 812–13 (1992) (“For more
than a century, bar officials asserted that ‘self-regulation’ was the only enforcement system compatible with the fact that lawyers are ‘independent professionals.”’); cf. Barnhizer, supra note 19, at 217 (“Self-regulation is at the
core of lawyers’ arguments that they should be entrusted with oversight of the
behavior of lawyers, but self-regulation by lawyers and judges has not
worked.”); Mark D. Nozette & Robert A. Creamer, Professionalism: The Next
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This Article argues that the continued emphasis on lawyer
self-regulation exacts costs. Conceiving of the disciplinary codes
as mere professional self-regulation rather than as one element
of an expansive regulatory regime governing the bar misleads
courts, code drafters, lawyers, and laypersons alike. The myth
of self-regulation has serious ramifications both for the development of the law governing lawyers and for everyday legal
practice. The Article therefore proposes an amendment to the
Model Rules that would eliminate all reference to selfregulation and replace it with a more accurate statement of the
status of the professional codes.
It is important, at the outset, to acknowledge that commentators attribute various meanings to the term “selfregulation.”22 Some commentators, recognizing that the power
to discipline lawyers has shifted from bar organizations to state
judiciaries, assume that lawyer-judges who supervise disciplinary cases are likely to give special solicitude to the interests of
the bar.23 By their reasoning, any regulation which involves
lawyers as contributors to, or in the enforcement of, the prevailing norms is “self-regulation.”24 This Article, in contrast, pre-

Level, 79 TUL. L. REV. 1539, 1540 (2005) (characterizing self-regulation as a
“core professional value”).
22. See F. Raymond Marks & Darlene Cathcart, Discipline Within the Legal Profession: Is It Self-Regulation?, 1974 U. ILL. L.F. 193, 194 –95 (“[T]wo
tasks are involved in the process of self-regulation: the task of monitoring conduct and the task of maintaining the quality of performance.”).
23. See, e.g., Margaret Onys Rentz, Laying Down the Law: Bringing Down
the Legal Cartel in Real Estate Settlement Services and Beyond, 40 GA. L. REV.
293, 307 (2005) (“[L]eniency in disciplinary action—a product of the bar’s selfregulation—is no doubt part of what fuels public contempt for the profession.”); Sahl, supra note 10, at 74 –75 (drawing a link between negative public
perception of the bar and its sense that self-regulation through the disciplinary process is ineffective).
24. See Benjamin H. Barton, Do Judges Systematically Favor the Interests
of the Legal Profession?, 59 ALA. L. REV. 453, 455 (2008) (arguing that the regulation of lawyers “by lawyers/justices from the state supreme courts . . . has
been exceptionally helpful to the legal profession as a whole”); Nancy J. Moore,
The Usefulness of Ethical Codes, 1989 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 7, 15 (noting that
supervising courts “are comprised of judges, who are not only members of the
broader legal profession, but also former (and potentially future) practicing
lawyers. . . . As a result, the legal profession has achieved a degree of selfregulation far beyond . . . the expectations of any other professional group”);
Eric H. Steele & Raymond T. Nimmer, Lawyers, Clients, and Professional
Regulation, 1976 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 917, 921−22 (discussing selfregulation in terms of bar enforcement of admission requirements and the disciplinary codes); cf. Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 197 (“Perhaps the
best way to understand the present status of professional self-regulation is to
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supposes that judges overseeing lawyers take their independence from the bar and their regulatory functions seriously.
The Article therefore treats discipline by courts as a form of
regulation external to the profession.25 Even if this were not
the case, however, the Article’s core point would remain, because judicial enforcement of the disciplinary codes is only one
of many forms of regulation governing the bar.
This Article’s goal is narrow: to highlight the various adverse consequences that arise when different actors in the system—including the co-regulators of the bar, lawyers themselves, and the public—cling to an image of self-regulation. The
consequences may seem inconsistent. Sometimes, for example,
thinking in terms of self-regulation creates a self-fulfilling
prophecy in which an external regulator fails to adequately exercise its authority to constrain the bar. Identifying the regulator’s misperception can help produce a change in its practices.
At other times, however, the image of self-regulation may lead
an external regulator to falsely assume that a different regulator has deferred to the bar, causing it to undervalue the other
regulator’s actions. Eliminating that misconception may be a
prerequisite to properly dividing up the work of the coregulators. In yet other circumstances, the persistent image of
self-regulation affects the ways in which lawyers respond to legal ethics codes and members of the public respond to professional regulation as a whole. To the extent their responses are
misguided or undermine the effectiveness of professional regulation, clarifying the reality that law is heavily regulated by
multiple co-regulators can mute these reactions. This Article
observe the difference between the enunciated standards of performance and
conduct . . . and the reality of disciplinary enforcement.”).
25. As discussed infra in the text accompanying notes 80−84, in the days
before the adoption of the 1983 Model Rules, professional discipline was not a
vibrant enterprise. See ABEL, supra note 19, at 144 (noting that contemporary
lawyers “suffer few informal sanctions for violating ethical rules” and suggesting that formal disciplinary processes are not very effective). In modern times,
however, the threat of disciplinary sanction is real, bar prosecutors take themselves seriously, and courts routinely evaluate the conduct of lawyers through
the disciplinary process. See Symposium, Lessons from Enron: A Symposium
on Corporate Governance, 54 MERCER L. REV. 683, 711 (2003) (statement of
A.P. Carlton) (“It has [been] for 200 years the judicial branch of the states that
discipline lawyers. It’s not self-regulation as it’s often spoken of. It’s regulation
by the third party judicial branch or a statutory body in most states.” (alteration in original)); National Organization of Bar Counsel, History of the National Organization of Bar Counsel, http://www.nobc.org/history.aspx (last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (describing the history of coordinated efforts by bar
counsel).
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does not propose solutions to each of the adverse consequences
that the self-regulation myth produces,26 but rather attempts to
set the table for solutions by identifying the core misconception
and its consequences.
Part I of the Article clarifies why the notion of law as a
self-regulated industry developed and how it became archaic.
The history helps explain why the Model Rule drafters continue
to emphasize the concept. Part II highlights the reality that law
has become a heavily regulated industry in modern times. Although lawyers may contribute to the law governing the bar by
helping to develop rules and participating in the cases and legislative processes that produce substantive law constraining
the bar, lawyers do not control the outcomes. Part III addresses
the heart of this Article’s thesis by describing the impact of continued reliance on the notion of self-regulation. In light of the
resulting costs, Part IV suggests, and describes the potential
benefits of, an amendment to the Model Rules of Professional
Conduct that would begin to roll back the self-regulation myth.
I. THE HISTORY OF THE REGULATION OF
AMERICAN LAWYERS
There have always been lawyers in America, and many
played a critical role in the founding of the country.27 Most early American lawyers trained in England28 or apprenticed with
26. That is not to say that the author has no views on the subjects of dealing with self-interested professional regulation, the need to harmonize coregulation, or the appropriate distribution of the work of regulating lawyers.
See generally Bruce A. Green & Fred C. Zacharias, Permissive Rules of Professional Conduct, 91 MINN. L. REV. 265, 312–14 (2006) (discussing selfinterested professional rules); Fred C. Zacharias, The Humanization of Lawyers, PROF. LAW., 2002 Symposium Issue, at 9, 26–31 (discussing the appropriate distribution of the work of regulating lawyers); Zacharias & Green, supra note 4, (manuscript at 52–60) (discussing the importance of harmonizing
various forms of judicial regulation of lawyers).
27. See, e.g., ROSCOE POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUITY TO MODERN
TIMES 177–78 (1953) (“Twenty-five of the fifty-six signers of the Declaration of
Independence were lawyers.”); id. at 186 (discussing some of the great lawyers
of the post-revolutionary period).
28. See W. HAMILTON BRYSON, LEGAL EDUCATION IN VIRGINIA 1779−1979,
at 8–9 (1982) (identifying lawyers in colonial Virginia who attended the British Inns of Court and suggesting that the number decreased over time); 1 ANTON-HERMAN CHROUST, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION IN AMERICA 33
(1965) (discussing American lawyers who were trained in the British Inns of
Court); E. ALFRED JONES, AMERICAN MEMBERS OF THE INNS OF COURT ix−xxx
(1924) (noting the number of American lawyers who trained in the British
Inns of Court during the Revolutionary period); CHARLES WARREN, A HISTORY
OF THE AMERICAN BAR 188 (1966) (noting that many colonial lawyers “received
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lawyers who originally learned their skills in the motherland.29
There were no American professional law schools as we know
them today, although a few universities endowed individual
chairs of law in their undergraduate colleges.30 Bar organizations and rules of ethics governing lawyers simply did not exist.31 Any regulation of lawyers came from judges exercising
their authority to admit lawyers to practice in their courts;32
these judges could forbid lawyers to appear, sanction them for
their legal education in London in the Inns of Court”); cf. David D. Garner,
Comment, The Continuing Vitality of the Case Method in the Twenty-First
Century, 2000 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 307, 309 (discussing the English training of
lawyers in colonial times, but noting that “after the Revolution, legal education by this method steadily declined in popularity in favor of the increasingly
available and less expensive domestic alternatives”).
29. See MARIAN C. MCKENNA, TAPPING REEVE AND THE LITCHFIELD LAW
SCHOOL 1, 9 (1986) (discussing the practice of apprenticeships in the early
American legal profession); Daniel R. Coquillette, The Legal Education of a
Patriot: Josiah Quincy Jr.’s Law Commonplace (1763), 39 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 317,
319–21 (2007) (identifying apprenticeships chronicled by noted early-American
lawyers); Charles R. McKirdy, The Lawyer as Apprentice: Legal Education in
Eighteenth Century Massachusetts, 28 J. LEGAL EDUC. 124, 125 (1977) (discussing the early apprenticeship process); cf. POUND, supra note 27, at 178
(noting that “a large number of the older and stronger lawyers were loyalists
and left the country or ceased to practice,” leaving legal practice “in the hands
of lawyers of a lower type and of less ability and training”).
30. See, e.g., Paul D. Carrington, The Revolutionary Idea of University Legal Education, 31 WM. & MARY L. REV. 527, 527 (1990) (discussing Thomas
Jefferson’s institution of a chair in “Law and Police” at William and Mary in
1779). The first full university law school was Harvard, which was established
in 1817, but its fortunes promptly declined. See Coquillette, supra note 29, at
323; see also John H. Langbein, Blackstone, Litchfield, and Yale: The Founding of Yale Law School, in HISTORY OF THE YALE LAW SCHOOL 17, 17–36 (Anthony T. Kronman ed., 2004) (discussing the evolution of Yale Law School from
its origins as a proprietary institution to its formal association with Yale in
the 1820s).
31. See POUND, supra note 27, at 201−15, 223−32, 243 (discussing the earliest, often unsuccessful, bar associations and concluding that “[n]one of the
associations listed as organized before 1850 left permanent records and they
all seem to have had only a temporary existence”); Carol Rice Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800 Year Evolution, 57 SMU L. REV. 1385,
1420 (2004) (“[B]ar associations themselves were rare and their rules related
only marginally to substantive practice standards.”).
32. See, e.g., 2 CHROUST, supra note 28, at 250 (noting that the New York
State Constitution of 1777 required ‘“all attorneys . . . be appointed by the
court . . . and be regulated by the rules and orders of the said courts’” (quoting
N.Y. CONST. of 1777, art. XXVII (1802))); CHARLES W. WOLFRAM, MODERN
LEGAL ETHICS 53 (1986) [hereinafter WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS]
(“[D]isciplinary control was dispersed among local courts.”); Charles W. Wolfram, Towards a History of the Legalization of American Legal Ethics—I. Origins, 8 U. CHI. L. SCH. ROUNDTABLE 469, 474 (2001) (discussing the history
and procedure of judicial regulation of lawyers).
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litigation misconduct, or punish them in more indirect ways.33
No formal or uniform standards governing lawyer behavior or
judicial evaluation of lawyer practice were evident.
Thus, in the post-revolutionary period of the United States,
law truly was a self-regulated profession. Faced with a vacuum
of regulatory institutions and standards of conduct, it was natural that informal norms of practice developed. Lawyers talked
to each other, visited in groups at local inns and eating clubs,
and depended on each other for reciprocal courtesy that made
the practice of law dignified, civil, and relatively efficient.34 Collegial assumptions about the profession developed, such as the
fact that lawyers should act as gentlemen and that gentlemen
should not betray their clients’ secrets.35
In the middle of the nineteenth century, the profession’s
internal debate about how it should behave blossomed. Proponents of Henry Lord Brougham’s view of an ultra-aggressive
adversary system36 clashed with adherents to David Hoffman’s

33. See, e.g., Ex Parte Steinman & Hensel, 95 Pa. 220, 237 (1880) (“We
entertain no doubt that a court has jurisdiction . . . to strike the name of an
attorney from the roll in a proper case.”); Andrews, supra note 31, at 1417
(noting several early statutes “providing for judicial disbarment of lawyers in
cases of deceit or malpractice”); cf. POUND, supra note 27, at 185 (“Discipline
by the courts was invoked only in rare and extreme cases.”).
34. See, e.g., WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 34 (describing
the evolution of bar associations from local eating clubs); Hopkins, supra note
18, at 862 n.87 (“[T]he country’s earliest bar associations . . . were primarily
established as avenues for fellowship.”).
35. See James M. Altman, Considering the A.B.A.’s 1908 Canons of Ethics,
71 FORDHAM L. REV. 2395, 2400 (2003) (“[T]he Canons were animated by the
vision of a self-regulating profession in which lawyers engaged in their professional activities as gentlemen.”); William T. Gallagher, Ideologies of Professionalism and the Politics of Self-Regulation in the California State Bar, 22 PEPP.
L. REV. 485, 510 (1995) (“Drawing on the model of an idealized English gentlemanly class, the legal profession attempted to create a public image of lawyers as a class of gentlemen.”); Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CAL. L. REV. 1061, 1070 (1978)
(“[S]ome of the early cases express the idea that the privilege was that of the
lawyer (a gentleman does not give away matters confided to him).”); Russell G.
Pearce, The Legal Profession as a Blue State: Reflections on Public Philosophy,
Jurisprudence, and Legal Ethics, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 1339, 1348 (2006)
(“Americans transformed the English notion of lawyers as gentlemen by class
into a conception of lawyers as gentlemen as a moral badge of their ability to
rise above self-interest, whatever their class origin.”).
36. See 2 TRIAL OF QUEEN CAROLINE 8 (Joseph Nightingale ed., J. Robins
& Co. Albion Press 1821) (reporting Lord Brougham’s famous statement: “An
advocate, in the discharge of his duty, knows but one person in all the world,
and that person is his client”).

1158

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1147

Fifty Resolutions of Professional Deportment,37 which emphasized moral considerations over client orientation.38 Courts,
continuing to provide the only formal regulation, tended to take
a middle-ground position in the debate about lawyers’ ethics,
but only in the context of individual cases.39 Lawyers, for the
most part, were left to formulate their own views regarding appropriate behavior.40
Three developments in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries began to give structure to the profession and
professional norms. First, professional law schools, which
opened in fits and starts throughout the nineteenth century,
took hold and began to impart a shared experience to larger
numbers of the bar.41 Second, around the turn of the twentieth
century, central bar examining boards became more common,
creating a mandate of education that helped regularize prac-

37. See DAVID HOFFMAN, Fifty Resolutions in Regard to Professional Deportment, in A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY 751, 752−75 (2d ed. 1836), reprinted
in HENRY S. DRINKER, LEGAL ETHICS 338−51 (2d prtg. 1954).
38. See, e.g., id. at 338 (Resolution I) (“I will never permit professional
zeal to carry me beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum.”); id. (Resolution
II) (“I will espouse no man’s cause out of envy hatred, or malice toward his antagonist.”); id. at 339 (Resolution X) (“Should my client be disposed to insist on
captious requisitions, or frivolous and vexatious defenses, they shall be neither
enforced nor countenanced by me.”); id. at 340 (Resolution XIV) (“My client’s
conscience and my own are distinct entities.”); id. at 346 (Resolution XXXIII)
(“What is morally wrong cannot be professionally right.”). For a discussion of
the Brougham-Hoffman debate and the surrounding historical context, see
Fred C. Zacharias & Bruce A. Green, Reconceptualizing Advocacy Ethics, 74
GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 2–4, 24 –30 (2005).
39. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 38, at 30–35 (discussing one nineteenth-century court’s analysis of the responsibilities and regulation of lawyers’ conduct).
40. See Pearce, supra note 35, at 1349–50 (discussing the nineteenthcentury debate about the ethical obligations of lawyers).
41. See ALBERT P. BLAUSTEIN & CHARLES O. PORTER, THE AMERICAN
LAWYER: A SUMMARY OF THE SURVEY OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION 167–70
(1954) (discussing the introduction of the case method into legal education);
ROBERT STEVENS, LAW SCHOOL: LEGAL EDUCATION IN AMERICA FROM THE
1850S TO THE 1980S 73−84 (1983) (discussing the rise of American law
schools); Coquillette, supra note 29, at 324 (discussing the development of the
Harvard curriculum in the 1870s and arguing that its influence on the “intellectual development of modern American lawyers has been profound. ‘Thinking like a lawyer’ has been defined by this educational experience for a century.”); Gallagher, supra note 35, at 512 (“[B]y the mid-nineteenth century bar
associations were eclipsed in many respects by the development of the modern
law school.”).
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tice.42 Third, and most importantly, bar associations began to
develop43—partly in reaction to the uncertainty spawned by the
ongoing debate regarding the role of lawyers and partly as an
effort by elite lawyers to raise the economic and social status of
the bar organizations’ members.44

42. See Michael Bard & Barbara A. Bamford, The Bar: Professional Association or Medieval Guild?, 19 CATH. U. L. REV. 393, 395 (1970) (noting that
between 1870 and 1920, most states created central examination boards).
In the early period, judges sometimes administered oral examinations
as a prerequisite to practice. See ALFRED ZANTZINGER REED, TRAINING FOR
THE PUBLIC PROFESSION OF THE LAW 101 (1921) (finding that by 1870, twentynine jurisdictions had courts, judges, or ad hoc committees conducting oral examinations); Paul T. Hayden, Putting Ethics to the (National Standardized)
Test: Tracing the Origins of the MPRE, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1299, 1315 (2003)
(noting that oral exams were required in New Jersey as early as 1755). Many
states, however, offered admission to practice without proof of skills or knowledge. See MICHAEL BURRAGE, REVOLUTION AND THE MAKING OF THE CONTEMPORARY LEGAL PROFESSION 153 (2006) (noting a movement in the early
nineteenth century “to reduce, and then eliminate altogether, the requirements that had formerly governed admission to the bar”); Hayden, supra at
1314 –15 (citing Indiana’s pre-1932 constitutional provision that “Every person
of good moral character, being a voter, shall be entitled to admission to practice law in all courts of justice”); see also POUND, supra note 27, at 182 (“All
states made admission easy with a minimum of qualification.”); Francis L.
Wellman, Admission to the Bar, 15 AM. L. REV 295, 298 (1881) (finding that by
1870 “[a] mass of persons had been admitted to the profession without any liberal education, with barely the rudiments of English grammar, sometimes
without being able to pronounce the language, and with such a smattering of
law as could be gained by reading Blackstone a few months”). In 1855, Massachusetts became the first state to administer a written bar examination, but
this effort apparently was short-lived. See 2 CHROUST, supra note 28, at
231−32 (discussing the loosening of standards for admission to the Massachusetts bar); REED, supra at 101 n.3 (concluding that the Massachusetts’ requirement lasted only until 1859); WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32,
at 198 (noting Massachusetts’ original bar exam). New York adopted an examination involving both written and oral components in 1877. Robert M. Jarvis, An Anecdotal History of the Bar Exam, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 359, 374
(1996) (noting New York’s adoption of the examination). Soon thereafter, Idaho and Nevada began experimenting with written tests. Id. Many states
adopted such tests in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See
Hayden, supra at 1317 (discussing the development of written bar examinations).
43. See JAMES WILLARD HURST, THE GROWTH OF AMERICAN LAW: THE
LAW MAKERS 286 (1950) (reporting that eight city and eight state bar associations formed between the foundation of the New York city bar in 1870 and the
establishment of the American Bar Association in 1878); Philip J. Wickser,
Bar Associations, 15 CORNELL L.Q. 390, 396 (1930) (“Almost all bar associations, as we know them today, have been organized since 1870.”).
44. See, e.g., Mary M. Devlin, The Development of Lawyer Disciplinary
Procedures in the United States, 7 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 911, 918 (1994) (finding that the elimination of formal training requirements during the era of
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Bar associations represented the modern form of lawyer
self-regulation. Local bar organizations reflecting loose associations of lawyers had existed for a long time.45 A few of these exercised some control over local admission of lawyers to practice,
but most did not.46 The first major bar association, the Bar of
the City of New York, came into being in 1870,47 soon followed
in 1878 by the ABA,48 a purportedly national bar organization
with the avowed purpose of elevating the image of the profession.49 State bar associations subsequently continued to develop,50 usually consisting of successful, like-minded lawyers who
hoped to influence the way society viewed and regulated the
profession.51 They were a natural reaction to the development
of bar examinations and increasing judicial regulation.
Legal ethics codes became the primary mechanism by
which these private organizations of lawyers could have input
into what courts were saying about the lawyer’s role. The first
formal code was adopted in Alabama in 1887.52 The first ABA
Jacksonian democracy created concerns over a lack of professional control and,
ultimately, led to the formation of local bar associations in the 1870s).
45. A few bar associations existed during the colonial period, but most of
these disbanded by the early nineteenth century. See BURRAGE, supra note 42,
at 257 (“Every existing bar association except one collapsed.”); Andrews, supra
note 31, at 1434 (“Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth century.”); Elizabeth
Chambliss, Professional Responsibility: Lawyers, a Case Study, 69 FORDHAM
L. REV. 817, 829 (2000) (finding that the “colonial bar associations, having lost
their de facto control over admission, eventually ‘crumbled and disappeared’”
after the Revolutionary War (citation omitted)); Devlin, supra note 44, at 918
(noting hostility to the bar as a group that began in the 1830s and lasted to
the end of the Civil War).
46. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 35, at 512−13 (discussing the early
pre- and post-Revolutionary War bar associations and their attempts to control admission to the profession); Wickser, supra note 43, at 393–94 (describing hostile reactions to early bar associations’ attempts to regulate the legal
profession).
47. Wickser, supra note 43, at 396.
48. WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 34.
49. See HURST, supra note 43, at 287 (noting that the ABA sought to raise
the economic and social status of lawyers, especially its members).
50. See id. (finding that twenty state or territorial bar associations had
established by 1890; forty by 1900; forty-eight by 1916; and all states and territories had some sort of association by 1925); Wickser, supra note 43, at 400
(discussing the existence of more than 650 state and local bar associations nationwide, in practically every state, by 1916).
51. See, e.g., Wickser, supra note 43, at 396 (noting that the New York
Bar’s purpose was, according to its constitution, “to maintain the honor and
dignity of the profession”).
52. ALA. STATE BAR ASS’N, CODE OF ETHICS (1887), reprinted in 2 ALA.
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model code, the Canons of Ethics, was adopted in 1908.53 Although these codes had no legal force, they were intended to
guide lawyers and influence judges about the content of lawyer
responsibilities.54 Over time, courts increasingly looked to the
Canons as establishing norms for the profession.55
These developments emboldened the leaders of the legal
profession and led to an effort in the early twentieth century to
formalize lawyer self-regulation. Local bar associations grew,
increasing their political clout, and eventually sought to exercise legal control over the profession.56 In the 1920s, a movement began to produce court rules or statutes requiring all
practicing lawyers to belong to state bar organizations.57 This
allowed the organizations to collect fees, control (and limit)
admission to the bar, and participate in the discipline of lawyers.58 Some states developed deferential practices by which

LAW. 245, 259 (1941); see also Carol Rice Andrews, The Lasting Legacy of the
1887 Code of Ethics of the Alabama State Bar Association, in GILDED AGE LEGAL ETHICS: ESSAYS ON THOMAS GOODE JONES’ 1887 CODE AND THE REGULATION OF THE PROFESSION 7, 7 (Carol Rice Andrews et al. eds., 2003) (identifying the Alabama code as “the first code of its kind”).
53. AM. BAR ASS’N, CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS (1908).
54. See Jacob M. Dickinson, Address of the President, 33 A.B.A. REP. 341,
356 (1908) (statement of the ABA president expressing his hope that states
would adopt and enforce the 1908 canons).
55. See Altman, supra note 35, at 2395−96 (cataloguing state adoptions of
the Canons and noting their hegemony); Peter A. Joy, Making Ethics Opinions
Meaningful: Toward More Effective Regulation of Lawyers’ Conduct, 15 GEO.
J. LEGAL ETHICS 313, 327 (2002) (noting that state courts often deferred to local bar associations for both ethical standards and their enforcement).
56. See Gallagher, supra note 35, at 517−21 (discussing the
“[i]nstitutionalization of [c]ollegial [c]ontrol” in the early twentieth century);
Joy, supra note 55, at 327 (discussing the increasing role of bar associations
around the turn of the century).
57. See HURST, supra note 43, at 292 (discussing the movement towards
integrated bars); WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 36 n.6 (“North
Dakota’s was the first bar integrated, by legislation, in 1921.”).
58. See HURST, supra note 43, at 292 (suggesting that the model of an “enforced, all inclusive membership of lawyers in one organization” sought to replace voluntary bar organizations’ historical lack of authority over laypersons
and inability to set norms for the profession). By 1930, seven states had mandatory bars and within three years that number rose to eighteen. Barton, supra note 19, at 432 n.77. By 1954, twenty-five states had integrated bars. Id.
(citing BLAUSTEIN & PORTER, supra 41, at 240−41). As of 2007, thirty-three
American jurisdictions (including the District of Columbia) are integrated.
UNIFIED BARS, ISSUES UPDATE 1 (2007), http://www.abanet.org/barserv/
issuesupdate/updates07/unifiedbars.pdf.
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they placed at least the initial stage of professional discipline
directly in the hands of state and local bar associations.59
Bar organizations increasingly focused their mission on
elevating the status of law as a profession, partly in the hope
that self-regulation of the profession would prevent outside
regulators from treating lawyers as ordinary businessmen.60
These efforts culminated in the promulgation of the ABA’s
Code of Professional Responsibility in 1969,61 which replaced
the vague Canons of Ethics with a set of relatively precise
norms that looked more like enforceable regulatory constraints
on lawyer behavior.62 Virtually all of the states adopted the
Code as law and began to use it as a disciplinary mechanism.63
Thus developed the model for modern self-regulation. The
profession itself established the norms governing lawyers. Although the professional codes were enforced through state disciplinary mechanisms, the state supreme courts (and in some
cases the legislatures) adopted the bar-promulgated norms unquestioningly and, in some instances, used local bar associa59. See, e.g., Leslie C. Levin, The Case for Less Secrecy in Lawyer Discipline, 20 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1, 14 (2007) (“By the early 1930s, the courts or
legislatures in many states had conferred on bar associations express authority to investigate complaints, subpoena power to conduct investigations, and
the authority to impose certain types of discipline sanctions.” (footnotes omitted)); see also Joy, supra note 55, at 327 (suggesting that between 1908 and
1969, “the regulation of lawyers was essentially the sole domain of bar associations”).
In 1909, Illinois became the first jurisdiction officially recognizing the
bar’s duty to supervise and discipline members of the bar, with California following suit twelve years later. ORIE L. PHILLIPS & PHILBRICK MCCOY, CONDUCT OF JUDGES AND LAWYERS 96, 104−05 (1952). The California Supreme
Court eventually recognized the bar as an administrative agency of the court,
overturning bar decisions only in cases involving an honest difference of opinion. Id. at 100. For the next forty years, it was typical for bar organizations to
be the first to handle lawyer disciplinary complaints despite the fact that
courts usually retained “the exclusive power to suspend or disbar.” Levin, supra at 15−16.
60. See Gallagher, supra note 35, at 529 (discussing how self-regulation
privileges lawyers over other professions that are often regulated by the legislature).
61. AM. BAR ASS’N, CODE OF PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY (1969).
62. See Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J.
1239, 1251 (1991) (“[W]hereas the Canons and the Ethical Considerations
represented fraternal understandings that memorialized a shared group discourse, the DR’s functioned as a statute defining the legal contours of a vocation whose practitioners were connected primarily by having been licensed to
practice law.”).
63. See WOLFRAM, MODERN ETHICS, supra note 32, at 56 (stating that by
1972 all but three jurisdictions had adopted the code).

2009]

MYTH OF SELF-REGULATION

1163

tions and private volunteers to enforce those norms.64 Moreover, because of limited resources, instances of professional discipline were relatively rare and unpublicized.65 To this point,
other forms of lawyer regulation, such as malpractice liability,
were muted or altogether non-existent.66
II. CHANGES IN LAWYER SELF-REGULATION AND THE
ROAD TO THE STATUS QUO
It is beyond the scope of this Article to discuss all the
changes that affected the legal profession in the late twentieth
century, or the reasons for those changes.67 The most significant include the due process revolution,68 the changing demographics of the bar69 and economics of legal practice (including
the growth of corporate firms),70 and the development of the
64. See Vincent R. Johnson, Justice Tom C. Clark’s Legacy in the Field of
Legal Ethics, 29 J. LEGAL PROF. 33, 49 (2005) (discussing the use of volunteer
prosecutors to enforce attorney discipline in the mid-twentieth century); see
also AM. BAR ASS’N SPECIAL COMM. ON THE EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT, PROBLEMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS IN DISCIPLINARY ENFORCEMENT 19 (1970) (final draft) [hereinafter CLARK REPORT] (criticizing the use of
volunteer attorneys).
65. See ABEL, supra note 19, at 146−51 (describing the absence of effective
discipline through the early 1980s); Levin, supra note 59, at 14 (“When bar
associations became involved in lawyer discipline, the discipline process and
the sanctions imposed became considerably more private.”); Janine C. Ogando,
Note, Sanctioning Unfit Lawyers: The Need for Public Protection, 5 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 459, 468 (1991) (“Statistical information was almost impossible
to get because either no records were kept, or the quality and extent of the
records were inconsistent.”).
66. Cf. ABEL, supra note 19, at 150−51 (discussing successful claimants’
difficulty in getting damages because their only recourse was against attorneys who would often claim bankruptcy to avoid paying damages).
67. See Fischer, supra note 1, at 96 (offering explanations for the “sea of
change in attitudes toward the regulation of lawyers” that occurred in the latter half of the twentieth century); Gallagher, supra note 35, at 504−07 (discussing the theoretical explanations for the “progression from a ‘gentlemanly’
to a modern elite profession”).
68. For a discussion of the effect of the due-process revolution on the legal
profession and its approach to professional norms, see Fred C. Zacharias, Reconciling Professionalism and Client Interests, 36 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1303,
1318−22 (1995).
69. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 538 (3d
ed. 2005) (discussing the changing numbers of women and minorities entering
the bar after the 1960s); JOHN P. HEINZ ET AL., URBAN LAWYERS: THE NEW
SOCIAL STRUCTURE OF THE BAR 315−19 (2005) (discussing the growth of the
legal profession and changing demographics of Chicago lawyers between 1975
and 1995).
70. See AM. BAR ASS’N, SECTION OF LEGAL EDUC. & ADMISSIONS TO THE
BAR, TEACHING AND LEARNING PROFESSIONALISM 3−4 (1996) (noting that
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regulatory state.71 What is significant, for our purposes, is that
by the time the ABA attended to its next model code, the Model
Rules, the world of law practice had been transformed. Outside
regulators—especially the courts—had begun to question the
profession’s practices and to think of law as simply another
business potentially needing regulation.72
Against this background, the drafters of the Model Rules
clung to the hope of its self-regulatory model; namely, that the
development of carefully crafted but voluntary professional
codes would fend off outside regulation of the bar.73 The ABA’s
expectations, however, were short-lived. The process of drafting
the Model Rules drew far more media attention than any past
attempt at self-regulation.74 The Model Rules were publicly debated and produced substantial disagreement.75 Because of the
“[c]hanges in economics of the practice of law” have “converted law practice
from a profession to a business”); John M. Conley, How Bad Is It out There?:
Teaching and Learning About the State of the Legal Profession in North Carolina, 82 N.C. L. Rev. 1943, 1966−67 (2004) (discussing the “evolution of private-firm practice . . . from 1960 to 1995 . . . including the growth in law firm
size; the changing economics of law practice, . . . and the consequent difficulty
of balancing personal and professional lives.” (citing MICHAEL TROTTER, PROFIT AND THE PRACTICE OF LAW: WHAT’S HAPPENED TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
81−100 (1997))); Robert A. Stein, The Future of the Legal Profession, 91 MINN.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2006) (“The management and economics of law practice have also
changed dramatically [in the late twentieth century].”).
71. Presumably, as the federal and state governments increased regulatory oversight of the overall American economy, the business of law became fairer game as well. See Thomas McInerney, Putting Regulation Before Responsibility: Towards Binding Norms of Corporate Responsibility, 40 CORNELL INT’L
L.J. 171, 177 n.24 (2007) (noting that more than fifty-five new federal agencies
were created between the 1960s and the 1980s).
72. The United States Supreme Court, for example, applied antitrust doctrines to bar regulations. See Goldfarb v. Va. State Bar, 421 U.S. 773, 793
(1975). The Court also protected legal advertising. See Bates v. State Bar of
Ariz., 433 U.S. 350, 383 (1977). Pressed by organizations, such as the Consumers Union, that sought to demystify the profession by gathering and publishing information about legal practice, lower courts questioned professional
rules that maintained the guild. See, e.g., Consumers Union of U.S., Inc. v.
Am. Bar Ass’n, 505 F. Supp. 822, 823−24 (E.D. Va. 1981), aff ’d in part, rev’d in
part on other grounds, 688 F.2d 218 (4th Cir. 1982) (upholding a claim, in
theory, that a bar rule forbidding publication of an attorney directory was unconstitutional).
73. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl.; see also ABEL, supra
note 19, at 142 (“Self-regulation . . . helped stave off state regulation.”).
74. See, e.g., Ted Schneyer, Professionalism as Bar Politics: The Making of
the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 14 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 677,
695−701, 734 (1989) (describing public attention focused on the adoption of the
Model Rules).
75. See, e.g., Stephen Gillers, What We Talked About When We Talked
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dissent, as states began to consider the new code, they took
their role in adopting (or refusing to adopt) its provisions more
seriously.76 Unlike with the Model Code, which was adopted
promptly and almost unanimously,77 the various American jurisdictions split sharply in their approaches to the Model
Rules.78 Some accepted the proposed rules wholesale, some tinkered with the new provisions, and others retained—in part or
completely—the older Model Code.79
This new regulatory independence was not superficial. In
the past, states had failed to take the supervision of lawyers seriously in several ways.80 Not only did they accept the ABA’s
substantive proposals unquestioningly, but they also devoted
extremely limited resources to enforcement of the rules.81 Personnel friendly to the bar dominated disciplinary prosecutions.82 Reports regarding discipline, which might have provided a common law defining appropriate behavior of lawyers,
were virtually absent.83 This all changed after the adoption of
the Model Rules, with its surrounding publicity.84
About Ethics: A Critical View of the Model Rules, 46 OHIO ST. L.J. 243, 243–44
(1985) (discussing the controversy surrounding the proposed Model Rules).
76. See id. at 243.
77. See supra text accompanying note 63.
78. See, e.g., Michael H. Rubin, Uniform Rules, Non-Uniform Solutions,
49 LA. B.J. 362, 362 (“Noticeably absent from the move towards uniformity,
however, is the treatment by states of the ABA’s Model Rules of Professional
Conduct.”).
79. See id.
80. See generally Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22 (reporting inadequacies in the processes used by pre-1974 disciplinary agencies).
81. See CLARK REPORT, supra note 64, at 19–23. The deficiencies in the
early disciplinary processes were first noted by an ABA committee chaired by
retired Supreme Court Justice Tom C. Clark. See generally id.
82. See id. at 24 (criticizing the existing disciplinary processes of agencies
whose “members . . . are required to pass judgment on the conduct of attorneys
with whom they are personally acquainted”); Devlin, supra note 44, at 920 (asserting that the “‘bar police[d] its own ranks’” (quoting GLENN R. WINTERS,
BAR ASSOCIATION ORGANIZATION AND ACTIVITIES: A HANDBOOK FOR BAR ASSOCIATION OFFICERS 6 (1954)) (alteration in original)); Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 224 (reporting a 1974 study of disciplinary agencies, criticizing
the lack of resources in many, and concluding that “the presence of professional staff in a disciplinary agency increases the probability that the staff will
perceive its constituency as broader than the agency, or even broader than the
bar”); Steele & Nimmer, supra note 24, at 924 (“Most professional discipline,
however, is conducted by part-time volunteer committees of local lawyers
working out of their own offices.”).
83. See, e.g., AM. BAR ASS’N, COMM’N ON EVALUATION OF DISCIPLINARY
ENFORCEMENT, LAWYER REGULATION FOR A NEW CENTURY 34 (1992) [hereinafter MCKAY REPORT] (finding that prior to the Clark Report, most jurisdic-
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Spurred in part by the ABA’s Clark Report,85 states began
to treat the discipline of lawyers as a significant enterprise.86
State supreme courts took control of the disciplinary process in
almost all of the states.87 Enforcement resources increased.88
tions kept all proceedings secret until the state high court issued an order
finding misconduct and that even thereafter records could usually be sealed by
complainants or respondents who sought a protective order); Fred C. Zacharias, Specificity in Professional Responsibility Codes: Theory, Practice, and the
Paradigm of Prosecutorial Ethics, 69 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 223, 238 n.45
(1993) (“Until recently, opinions of the bar and bar disciplinary committees
were extremely difficult to identify. Few states collected or indexed decisions
in a published format.”); cf. Sandra L. DeGraw & Bruce W. Burton, Lawyer
Discipline and “Disclosure Advertising”: Towards a New Ethos, 72 N.C. L. REV
351, 358 (1994) (“[C]urrent practices of disseminating the names and details of
lawyer discipline range from nonexistent to thoroughly systematic to randomly hit-or-miss.”); Levin, supra note 59, at 2 (“[E]ven today, much of the lawyer
discipline process in many states remains secret.”).
84. See Tanina Rostain, Ethics Lost: Limitations of Current Approaches to
Lawyer Regulation, 71 S. CAL. L. REV. 1273, 1280 (1998) (“The transition from
Code to Rules marked a fundamental shift in expectations for legal ethics. . . .
[T]he organized bar relinquished the ambition of articulating a unified statement of professional ideals in favor of clearly stating the enforceable legal obligations of lawyers. . . . [B]y forsaking professional aspirations in favor of the
‘law of lawyering,’ the bar accelerated the demise of self-regulation, opening
the door wide to regulatory forays by outside governmental agencies.”).
85. CLARK REPORT, supra note 64.
86. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 35, at 490 (noting that the California
legislature, in the mid-1980s and early 1990s, “criticized the Bar for having a
discipline system that was perceived to be slow, unresponsive, and overly protective of the interests of lawyers rather than the public interest[,]” which
“culminated in a threat by the Legislature to divest the Bar of its selfregulatory powers”).
87. See Joy, supra note 55, at 374 (“In the last thirty years, there has been
a slow but significant change in lawyer disciplinary systems as a growing
number of state supreme courts have taken exclusive control of the disciplinary process.”); Leslie C. Levin, The Emperor’s Clothes and Other Tales About
the Standards for Imposing Lawyer Discipline Sanctions, 48 AM. U. L. REV. 1,
3 (1998) (“Since the Clark Report, the ultimate responsibility for the administration of lawyer discipline in most states has moved, at least nominally, from
the state bars to the state courts.”); Ted Schneyer, Legal Process Scholarship
and the Regulation of Lawyers, 65 FORDHAM L. REV. 33, 37 n.24 (1996) (“[I]n
some states . . . state or local bar associations have lost administrative control
of the disciplinary system in favor of boards established by the state supreme
court.”).
88. See Johnson, supra note 64, at 70 (finding that the “deplorable” condition in attorney discipline found by the Clark Commission no longer exists
due, in part, to increased funding); Carol M. Langford & David M. M. Bell,
Finding a Voice: The Legal Ethics Committee, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 855, 867
(2002) (“[A]s a result of the groundbreaking recommendations of the Clark
Committee and McKay Commission . . . state disciplinary systems are significantly more professionalized, with increased funding and full-time professional staff.”); Levin, supra note 87, at 4 (“Lawyer discipline systems are better
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Disciplinary prosecution offices were reorganized and bolstered.89 States revised their disciplinary procedures, in some
instances introducing lay participation in the process90 and, in
one case, establishing separate, independent courts as overseers.91 Most importantly, although the disciplinary processes
in most instances remained confidential, decisions involving
discipline became somewhat more accessible; decisions were
reported in court reporters, bar journals, and legal newspapers
in ways that made them easier to locate, categorize, and compile.92
The attraction of regulating lawyers was not confined to
the disciplinary implementation of the professional rules. As
medical malpractice liability expanded, the door opened to in-

funded . . . than they used to be.”). Of course, one can argue that disciplinary
resources remain insufficient to be effective, but they are a far cry from the
previous threshold. Cf. DEBORAH RHODE, IN THE INTERESTS OF JUSTICE: REFORMING THE LEGAL PROFESSION 158−60 (2000) (arguing that the inadequate
resources devoted to discipline, among other problems, continue to undermine
the project of self-regulation through discipline).
89. See, e.g., MCKAY REPORT, supra note 83, at xiv (stating that by 1992
“almost all states” had a “professional disciplinary staff with statewide jurisdiction”); Gallagher, supra note 35, at 491 (“The resources expended on the
discipline system [in California] were increased substantially, and the lawyer
discipline bureaucracy was better staffed and organized.”).
90. See Devlin, supra note 44, at 928 (“By 1982, thirty-two states plus the
District of Columbia had public members serving on their disciplinary agencies.”); cf. ARIZ. STATE SENATE, FACT SHEET FOR S.C.R. 1005: PRACTICE OF
LAW, REGULATION (1997), http://www.azleg.state.az.us/legtext/43leg/1r/
summary/s.1005scr.grf.htm (proposing a constitutional amendment to establish a State Legal Professions Board authorized to regulate the practice of law
in Arizona and consisting of a majority of nonattorney members).
91. See Gallagher, supra note 35, at 590−93 (describing the evolution of
the California State Bar Court and its various features); The State Bar Court
of California, http://www.calbar.ca.gov/state/calbar/sbc_generic.jsp?cid=13469
(last visited Mar. 11, 2009) (“California is the only state in the nation with independent professional judges dedicated to ruling on attorney discipline cases.”).
92. Thirty to forty years ago, disciplinary decisions were virtually impossible to locate, other than the few abstracted in never-updated books. Over the
ensuing decades, disciplinary decision-making has remained relatively private, but many jurisdictions at least include abbreviated reports in local bar
periodicals. See DeGraw & Burton, supra note 83, at 357–58 (noting that
“most lawyer discipline has been invisible, although some slight movement
toward openness has occurred in recent years” and describing how states currently report disciplinary decisions); Fred C. Zacharias, What Lawyers Do
When Nobody’s Watching: Legal Advertising as a Case Study of the Impact of
Underenforced Professional Rules, 87 IOWA L. REV. 971, 1010 n.171 (2002)
(discussing ways in which disciplinary decisions are reported today).
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creased legal malpractice litigation.93 Courts soon found themselves presiding over a significant regime of common law regulation of the bar, including malpractice, breach of fiduciary duty, and contract law.94
Trial court supervision of lawyers in the course of litigation, which was recognized even in the early periods of the
American legal profession,95 increased during this period as
well. Part of the reason was the dramatic expansion of
scorched-earth legal practices by corporate law firms able to
devote time and resources to satellite litigation that highlighted lawyer misbehavior—including motions to disqualify96
and motions for sanctions under Rule 1197 and similar statutes.98
93. See Gary A. Munneke & Theresa E. Loscalzo, The Lawyer’s Duty to
Keep Clients Informed: Establishing a Standard of Care in Professional Liability Actions, 9 PACE L. REV. 391, 405 (1989) (“[D]evelopments in the field of legal malpractice parallel changes in medical malpractice law.”); Manuel R.
Ramos, Legal Malpractice: Reforming Lawyers and Law Professors, 70 TUL. L.
REV. 2583, 2590 (1996) (arguing that legal malpractice law should be reformed
in ways similar to medical malpractice law).
94. See ABEL, supra note 19, at 154 (noting a dramatic increase in liability
claims against lawyers starting in the late 1970s); George M. Cohen, Legal
Malpractice Insurance and Loss Prevention: A Comparative Analysis of Economic Institutions, 4 CONN. INS. L.J. 305, 346, 350 (1997) (noting that breach
of fiduciary obligations serves as a predicate for liability); Leubsdorf, supra
note 1, at 102 (“The time has come to consider legal malpractice law as part of
the system of lawyer regulation.”); see also id. at 153 n.213 (providing an example of lawyer liability based on breach of contract).
95. See Andrews, supra note 52, at 11 (“Courts retained their ‘inherent
authority’ to discipline or disbar lawyers for misconduct.”); Zacharias & Green,
supra note 38, at 32−36 (discussing judicial regulation of attorney conduct in
the nineteenth century).
96. James Lindgren, Toward a New Standard of Attorney Disqualification, 1982 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 419, 432−33 (discussing tactical disqualification motions); Ted Schneyer, Nostalgia in the Fifth Circuit: Holding the Line
on Litigation Conflicts Through Federal Common Law, 16 REV. LITIG. 537, 542
(1997) (“[I]t has become common for federal litigators to be charged with improper conflicts.”).
97. See FED. R. CIV. P. 11(c) (authorizing the imposition of sanctions upon
lawyers for various misconduct in filing pleadings); see also Lonnie T. Brown,
Jr., Ending Illegitimate Advocacy: Reinvigorating Rule 11 Through Enhancement of the Ethical Duty to Report, 62 OHIO ST. L.J. 1555, 1567 (2001) (“Empirical studies of the impact of Rule 11 following the 1983 changes invariably
reveal that the revisions spawned a veritable explosion of satellite litigation.”);
Bruce H. Kobayashi & Jeffrey S. Parker, No Armistice at 11: A Commentary
on the Supreme Court’s 1993 Amendment to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure, 3 SUP. CT. ECON. REV. 93, 107 (1993) (“[I]n the first nine
years of practice under the 1983 Amendment [to Rule 11], there were some
6,000 reported decisions under the rule, including 600 decisions by courts of
appeals and four decisions by the Supreme Court.”); Lawrence C. Marshall et
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Criminal prosecutors, particularly federal prosecutors,
increasingly targeted lawyers, thus producing yet another form
of regulation.99 Lawyers no longer were perceived as immune
from prosecution for acts committed while representing their
clients.100 Recognizing that communications with clients in furtherance of criminal acts might not be privileged,101 lawyers
were called to testify about their activities,102 opening the door
to further prosecutions.
At some point in this process, the conduct of lawyers became a political issue. In his presidential campaign, for example, George W. Bush blamed many of the country’s woes, including high medical costs, corporate fraud, and economic
stagnation, on misbehavior by trial lawyers.103 It therefore
al., The Use and Impact of Rule 11, 86 NW. U. L. REV. 943, 949−55 (1992) (surveying districts in the Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits and showing the frequency of sanction motions after the 1983 amendments expanding Rule 11).
98. See RONALD E. MALLEN & JEFFREY M. SMITH, 1 LEGAL MALPRACTICE
§ 10.13, at 708 & n.3 (4th ed. 1996) (listing state statutes directed at litigation
abuses); see also Cohen, supra note 94, at 350 (“[T]he expansion of third party
liability, fiduciary obligation, disqualification motions, and Rule 11, to name a
few, have turned professional responsibility from a quaint sideline to a business necessity.”).
99. See, e.g., William J. Genego, The New Adversary, 54 BROOK. L. REV.
781, 873 (1988) (noting that criminal defense attorneys are being prosecuted
with increasing frequency); Paul F. Rothstein, “Anything You Say May Be
Used Against You”: A Proposed Seminar on the Lawyer’s Duty to Warn of Confidentiality’s Limits in Today’s Post-Enron World, 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1745,
1749 n.16 (2007) (“[T]here seems to be an increasing tendency to prosecute
lawyers in connection with their client’s crimes . . . .”); Aviva Abramovsky,
Comment, Traitors in Our Midst: Attorneys Who Inform on their Clients, 2 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 676, 686−89 (2000) (discussing the increased targeting of attorneys for potential federal prosecution and the attendant rise in attorney
informants).
100. See generally Bruce A. Green, The Criminal Regulation of Lawyers, 67
FORDHAM L. REV. 327 (1998) (discussing the different approaches adopted by
courts in cases in which lawyers were prosecuted and/or disciplined for criminal behavior).
101. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Fallacy That Attorney-Client Privilege Has
Been Eroded: Ramifications and Lessons for the Bar, PROF. LAW., 1999 Symposium Issue, at 39, 41 (“The subpoenas typically seek unprivileged information—often information excepted from privilege through the crime-fraud exclusion.”).
102. See, e.g., Max D. Stern & David Hoffman, Privileged Informers: The
Attorney Subpoena Problem and a Proposal for Reform, 136 U. PA. L. REV.
1783, 1789 (1988) (noting the increasing number of attorney-subpoena cases);
Fred C. Zacharias, A Critical Look at Rules Governing Grand Jury Subpoenas
of Attorneys, 76 MINN. L. REV. 917, 919 & n.5 (1992) (“Over the past decade,
prosecutors increasingly have resorted to the tactic of subpoenaing lawyers to
appear as witnesses before the grand jury.”).
103. See, e.g., Ron Hutcheson, Trial Lawyers Get Bashed at Bush Economic
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should come as no surprise that federal and state legislatures
joined the regulatory frenzy. Many jurisdictions adopted laws
directly regulating lawyer trust accounts.104 Congress approved
a stronger Rule 11 designed to counteract excessive zeal by
lawyers105 as well as specific legislation mandating rules of professional behavior independent of the professional codes.106
Perhaps most prominently, federal agencies imposed their
own regulations on lawyers who appeared before them. During
the banking crises of the 1970s and 1980s, the Office of Thrift
Supervision (OTS) targeted law firms for their behavior in
representing banking institutions ultimately found wanting
under federal law, forcing many to pay large administrative
fines.107 But OTS was not alone; numerous agencies adopted
rules setting standards for legal practice that did not always
match the standards anticipated by the ABA in its selfregulatory rules.108 That trend has continued with the SEC’s
recent promulgation of rules under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act,
which the ABA contested fiercely.109
Conference, PHILA. INQUIRER, Dec. 16, 2004, at A02 (“A White House conference on the economy turned into a forum for bashing trial lawyers yesterday
as President Bush and his allies demanded congressional action to limit lawsuits.”).
104. See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT R. 1.15 (establishing
rules for the safekeeping of client and third-party property); Philip F. Downey,
Comment, Attorneys’ Trust Accounts: The Bar’s Role in the Preservation of
Client Property, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 275, 279 n.32 (1988) (“As of June, 1986, nearly all states had adopted an IOLTA [Interest on Lawyers Trust Accounts] program, and several states had decided that compliance with the IOLTA requirements would be mandatory (Arizona, California, Iowa, Minnesota, Ohio,
Washington, and Wisconsin).”).
105. Compare FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1983), with FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (1993)
(amended to limit what was perceived to be an overexpansion of sanctions under the 1983 amendments).
106. See, e.g., Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 15 U.S.C. § 7245 (2006) (requiring regulations governing securities lawyers).
107. See, e.g., Joyce A. Hughes, Law Firm Kaye, Scholer, Lincoln S&L and
the OTS, 7 NOTRE DAME J.L. ETHICS & PUB. POL’Y 177 (1993) (detailing the
OTS campaign); Office of Thrift Supervision, OTS, Kaye Scholer Agree to Settle
All Charges, OTS NEWS, Mar. 8, 1992, at 92–95 (describing the settlement secured from the law firm Kaye Scholer LLP).
108. See Zacharias, supra note 6, at 18–22 (citing a range of federal regulations); see also ABEL, supra note 19, at 154 (“[H]alf the proceedings against
lawyers initiated by the SEC between 1935 and 1980 were begun after 1975.”).
109. See, e.g., Letter from Alfred P. Carlton, Jr., President, Am. Bar Ass’n,
to Sec. & Exch. Comm’n (Dec. 18, 2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rules/
proposed/s74502/apcarlton1.htm (challenging rules proposed by the SEC pursuant to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act that limited a lawyer’s discretion when confronted by a client corporation’s misconduct).
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In short, the professional codes adopted by the ABA no
longer are sufficient to foreclose other regulation and, indeed,
do not represent self-regulation even in their own disciplinary
enforcement. A variety of regulators external to the ABA—
including the courts—interpret, adjust, and enforce the rules
and provide their own regulations when the prevailing professional code seems inadequate.110 At best, the codes are a form
of co-regulation. More realistically, they are the profession’s initial suggestions for partial standards that apply when other
considerations and external regulation do not trump.
III. CONSEQUENCES OF PERPETUATING THE MYTH OF
SELF-REGULATION
This Article has already suggested that, despite the reality
that law is a heavily regulated industry, commentators and
courts cling to the view that the profession is self-regulated.111
Of course, lawyers are heavily involved in all aspects of regulation. It is natural that lawyers should contribute to the drafting
of ethics rules because lawyers are the people most familiar
with law practice. Lawyers also participate in litigation involving lawyers because someone must present and defend the cases. Judges and high-ranking employees of administrative agencies that regulate lawyers tend to be members of the bar
because legal training qualifies them for those positions.
The involvement of members of the profession in all aspects of the regulatory process thus, in a limited sense, differentiates law from other regulated professions. Doctors, for instance, may have a hand in peer review mechanisms and state
certification boards but cannot control judicial or legislative
oversight. The more powerful position of lawyers in regulation
is inevitable because legislating and implementing legal rules
are at their core legal functions; it is lawyers who are trained
for these enterprises and have the requisite expertise. Although
110. In a forthcoming piece, John Leubsdorf notes:
[M]ore and more regulators have sought to regulate the bar. If once
the American Bar Association’s codes dominated the field, now courts
have become increasingly unwilling to defer to them, and legislators
and administrators have become increasingly unwilling to defer to either bar associations or courts. We are witnessing the decline of the
ideal of professional self-regulation at the same time that the ideal
has been almost entirely demolished in England.
John Leubsdorf, Legal Ethics Fall Apart, 56 BUFF. L. REV (forthcoming 2009)
(manuscript at 2), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1320302.
111. See supra notes 9–10.
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society could include more lay participants in the lawyer regulatory process, regulators would find themselves at significant
substantive and tactical disadvantages if they avoided all reliance on persons with legal training.112
The presence of persons with legal training among the regulators, however, does not automatically mean that the regulators tilt the law in lawyers’ favor.113 It simply means that the
regulators have knowledge about what lawyers do. Some commentators have questioned the good faith of the personnel who
draft the professional codes,114 but the consensus is that lawyer-regulators in other contexts—particularly judges and modern disciplinary prosecutors—implement their functions relatively objectively.115 Bemoaning as “self-regulatory” any lawyer
involvement in the enforcement of standards governing lawyers
therefore seems both tautological and of little substantive import.
Moreover, use of the term “self-regulation” to refer both to
the establishment of norms governing lawyers and lawyerjudges’ control of disciplinary processes can cause confusion in
thinking about lawyer regulation. Maintaining the presence of
lawyers throughout the regulatory process is not what many
commentators who support self-regulation have in mind when
referring to the importance of self-regulation.116 Rather, they
112. Cf. Burnele V. Powell, Creating Space for Lawyers To Be Ethical: Driving Towards an Ethic of Transparency, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1093, 1108 (2006)
(noting the “populist view” that lawyer regulation should be reorganized “to
assure that any organized voice for lawyers be subordinated to regulators who
are neither lawyers nor brought to the process by (or on behalf of ) lawyers”).
113. See Fox, supra note 16, at 1549 (“Lawyers only really self-regulate to
the extent that state supreme courts and other members of the judiciary
choose to delegate that authority to the profession.”).
114. See, e.g., Gillers, supra note 75, at 245, 255–56 (characterizing the
Model Rules as self-serving); Deborah L. Rhode, Why the ABA Bothers: A
Functional Perspective on Professional Codes, 59 TEX. L. REV. 689, 710–12
(1981) (describing particular code provisions as self-serving).
115. One notable exception among the commentators is Benjamin Barton.
See Barton, supra note 24, at 454 –55 (“[I]f there is a clear advantage or disadvantage to the legal profession in any given question of law, the cases are easy
to predict: judges will choose the route (within the bounds of precedent and
seemliness) that benefits the profession as a whole.”). Barton does not go so far
as to impugn the judiciary’s good faith, but suggests that the tilt in favor of
lawyers’ interests is objectively verifiable. See id. at 456–57, 503 (“It may be
that while judges treat lawyers differently—and better—this treatment is justified.”).
116. Some commentators do equate self-regulation with the fact that the
professional codes are enforced by judges who themselves are lawyers. See,
e.g., Lee, supra note 17, at 73 (“[A]lthough the judiciary is a branch of govern-
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envision a situation in which lawyers unilaterally implement
worthwhile rules117 and adhere to them voluntarily, so as to
obviate the need for outside interference with legal practice.118
Proponents also often imagine that lawyers will contribute to
the self-regulating process by reporting violations of the professional standards to disciplinary authorities.119
ment, it is a branch made up of lawyers.”); Rentz, supra note 23, at 307 (criticizing the performance of disciplinary judges).
117. See David J. Beck, The Legal Profession at the Crossroads: Who Will
Write the Future Rules Governing the Conduct of Lawyers Representing Public
Corporations?, 34 ST. MARY’S L.J. 873, 906–07 (2003) (“[T]he legal profession
is essentially a self-regulated profession . . . . [T]he rules governing the professional and ethical conduct of attorneys are primarily written, revised, and
promulgated by members of the legal profession.”); Fischer, supra note 1, at 95
(“[D]irect judicial regulation of the bar has been relaxed and distant. The judiciary, while retaining nominal power, has largely delegated responsibility for
professional control to the bar.”); Kevin E. Mohr, California’s Duty of Confidentiality: Is It Time for a Life-Threatening Criminal Act Exception?, 39 SAN
DIEGO L. REV. 307, 312 n.9 (2002) (“The legal profession is self-regulated, primarily through the various codes of professional conduct the states have
adopted during this century.”); Milton C. Regan, Jr., Corporate Norms and
Contemporary Law Firm Practice, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 931, 937–38 (2002)
(“The ostensibly unique nature of legal services has been invoked for more
than a century to justify self-regulation—the claim that the legal profession
should have authority to determine for itself the nature of its ethical obligations.”); cf. Barton, supra note 17, at 1186–210 (arguing that bar code drafters
largely control decisions of the state supreme courts deciding whether to adopt
proposed codes); Macey, supra note 10, at 1081 (positing that “the practice of
law is still self-regulated” and that “[c]ensure by a bar association [today] does
not carry much of a social stigma when the bar itself is not viewed with respect”).
118. See, e.g., Bruce A. Green, Bar Association Ethics Committees: Are They
Broken?, 30 HOFSTRA L. REV. 731, 733 (2002) (“This is one sense in which the
legal profession is partly . . . self-regulating: Lawyers have a personal responsibility to act in conformity with professional norms; . . . lawyers are presumably capable of figuring out what is expected of them, at least most of the
time.”).
William Gallagher characterizes the traditional argument in favor of selfregulation as follows:
[L]awyers, and other specialized professions, possess complex and
esoteric knowledge and skills; therefore, they should be allowed to
self-regulate because they alone have the specialized knowledge to
understand the unique nature of their profession’s problems and
hence, to apply effective cures. Outside interference in this process,
commentators argue, would undermine the profession’s public orientation and subject it to regulation that is harmful to both the profession and the public.
Gallagher, supra note 35, at 489; see also Pearce, supra note 35, at 1359−60
(discussing the relationship between self-regulation and professionalism that
is marked by an absence of self-interest).
119. See MODEL RULES OF PROF ’L CONDUCT pmbl. ¶ 12 (“A lawyer should
also aid in securing . . . observance [of the rules] by other lawyers.”); id. R. 8.3
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The following pages discuss the consequences of relying on
the idealized image of lawyers as self-monitoring and selfpolicing. The persistence of this self-regulation paradigm has
adverse effects on state supreme courts, trial courts supervising
litigation, bar regulators, lawyers, and laypersons dealing with,
or observing, the bar.
A. CONSEQUENCES FOR STATE SUPREME COURTS
State supreme courts are intimately involved in lawyer
regulation in three ways. First, they are responsible for promulgating their jurisdictions’ codes of professional responsibility,
a task they usually accomplish after reviewing and sometimes
amending (or rejecting) proposals that come from local bar
committees. Second, they oversee the disciplinary process by
serving as courts of last resort after findings of discipline are
made. Third, they preside as the ultimate courts of appeal over
the development of substantive common law governing lawyers
(e.g., malpractice law) and lower-court supervisory authority.
In one respect, it is odd that the notion of lawyer selfregulation persists when supreme courts, rather than the bar,
actually promulgate the prevailing professional codes. The notion survives, in part, because state supreme courts sometimes
fail to take an active role in the code-development process.
They may accept bar proposals unquestioningly and avoid serious inquiry into the substance. When state supreme courts
defer in this way, the best explanation is the concept of lawyer
self-regulation; the justices retain a sense that constraining
(implementing a limited reporting requirement); Arthur F. Greenbaum, The
Attorney’s Duty to Report Professional Misconduct: A Roadmap for Reform, 16
GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 259, 261–62 (2003) (characterizing the lawyer reporting
rule as “a rule at the heart of the bar’s claim to self-regulation”); Stanton Hazlett, Duty to Report Attorney Misconduct, J. KAN. B. ASS’N, Oct. 2004, at 11, 12
(“In Kansas the legal profession is self-regulated. As lawyers, we must ensure
that self-regulation continues by reporting lawyer misconduct when we have
knowledge of it.”); Carole R. Richelieu, Ethics & Issues, HAW. B.J., Dec. 2004,
at 18, 18 (“Why do attorneys have a duty to ‘squeal?’ The simple answer is because the legal profession is self-regulating.”). Most observers, however, note
that the reporting obligation has been honored mostly in the breach. See, e.g.,
Barnhizer, supra note 19, at 258 (“[L]awyers rarely report delinquent behavior
. . . .”); Zacharias, supra note 92, at 999 (“While violations of these provisions
are prosecuted occasionally, the reporting requirements typically are honored
in the breach.”); Julie L. Hussey, Comment, Reporting Another Attorney for
Violating the Rules of Professional Conduct: The Current Status of the Law in
the States Which Have Adopted the Model Rules of Professional Conduct, 23 J.
LEGAL PROF. 265, 266–67 (1999) (identifying only two cases in which attorneys
were disciplined for violating reporting rules).
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lawyer behavior is a project for the bar and that the courts
should get involved only, or mainly, when specific disputes involving particular misconduct arise.
Benjamin Barton120 and others121 have highlighted practical reasons why, quite separate from judges’ identity as lawyers,
state supreme courts might give in to the self-regulation paradigm despite their clear authority and responsibility for setting
the professional rules. Supreme court justices are not used to
developing law in the abstract, preferring instead to respond to
concrete cases.122 They do not have resources for conducting
legislative-type hearings.123 And they do not like to issue prospective or advisory decisions regarding the appropriateness or
legality of conduct.124
The consequences of abdication, however, are significant.
Abdication allows the supreme courts, and their law-making
authority, to be captured by the bar.125 The failure to delve
deeply into reform proposals may enable the bar to incorporate
self-serving provisions into the codes.126 For these reasons, I
and others have encouraged state supreme courts to take their
code-promulgation responsibility more seriously.127

120. Barton, supra note 17, at 1196.
121. See, e.g., Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (discussing the functions
and tendencies of state supreme courts when promulgating professional
codes).
122. See Barton, supra note 17, at 1204 (“Courts are not natural legislators. It cuts against the grain of their institutional mission and self-image.”).
123. See id. at 1207 (“Given that judges are faced with a scarcity of resources . . . something has to give. . . . [T]he abdication of their regulatory responsibilities is a convenient solution.” (footnote omitted)).
124. See generally Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Why the Supreme Court Never
Gets Any “Dear John” Letters: Advisory Opinions in Historical Perspective, 87
GEO. L.J. 473 passim (1998) (discussing the historical reluctance of courts to
issue advisory opinions).
125. See Barton, supra note 17, at 1186 (arguing that state supreme courts
have a propensity for being captured by the bar); cf. Lawrence W. Kessler, The
Unchanging Face of Legal Malpractice: How the “Captured” Regulators of the
Bar Protect Attorneys, 86 MARQ. L. REV. 457, 465–66 (2002) (arguing that all
the legal regulators of lawyers have been captured).
126. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 320 (arguing that state supreme courts should avoid rubber-stamping permissive rules because they are
particularly prone to being self-serving).
127. See id.; Fred C. Zacharias, Are Evidence-Related Ethics Provisions
“Law?,” 76 FORDHAM L. REV. 1315, 1334 (2007) (“The more state supreme
courts actively participate in the formulation of the professional rules . . . the
likelier it is that the discrepancies between ethics and evidence law . . . will
disappear.”).
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What is significant for purposes of this Article, however, is
that the myth of lawyers as self-regulators has consequences
for how state supreme courts act. Initially, thinking about professional standards in terms of self-regulation may encourage
the courts to avoid taking a strong position on the substance of
the codes. Thereafter, it often prevents the courts from conducting fully independent review of bar committee findings. The notion of self-regulation (in its most negative sense) thus becomes
a self-fulfilling prophecy: lawyer-judges do not adequately exercise their authority to constrain the bar’s excesses.
Perhaps more disappointing, however, is that thinking in
terms of self-regulation also prevents state supreme courts
from exercising functions that are exclusively within their purview. Standards in the professional codes often cover the same
conduct as other legal standards governing lawyers, including
civil law and judge-made supervisory decisions.128 Courts implementing the latter standards sometimes look to the professional codes for guidance but also often treat the codes as irrelevant, thus leading to inconsistent behavioral requirements for
lawyers.129 Because the state supreme courts have the power to
review lower courts’ decisions, they are in a unique position to
harmonize the decisions with the professional codes or to explain when divergence from the codes is justified.
In other words, state supreme courts have the wherewithal
to reconcile the professional codes with substantive law and
supervisory standards in two ways. First, when promulgating
the codes, they can predict in forward-looking fashion the direction the substantive law (e.g., malpractice law) will take because it is they who will have the power to adjust the substantive law. Supreme courts taking their code-promulgation role
seriously therefore can adopt professional rules that take account of lawyers’ potential liability under the substantive law
or judge-made supervisory requirements.130 Second, in reviewing lower courts’ supervisory and substantive law decisions on
appeal, supreme courts can, in backward-looking fashion, harmonize those decisions with the professional codes’ standards;
128. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 28–29); see also
infra note 133 and accompanying text (discussing these forms of regulation).
129. See Zacharias, supra note 127, at 1334 (“[C]ourts sometimes reject the
codes’ pronouncements on evidence law, sometimes defer to them (usually
through adoption of parallel common law), and sometimes agree with them
but do not treat them as legal gospel.”).
130. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 65) (discussing
state supreme courts’ “predictive function”).
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they can make clear when and why lower courts are justified in
departing from the codes’ standards governing lawyer behavior.131 To the extent that supreme courts continue to rely on
the notion of self-regulation to avoid active development of the
overall law governing lawyers, their misguided notion contributes to inconsistencies in the law and creates a regime in
which lawyers often have difficulty accurately assessing their
own responsibilities.
B. CONSEQUENCES FOR LOWER, SUPERVISORY COURTS
The converse also is true. Because lower courts persist in
perceiving the professional codes as a form of bar selfregulation, the courts often do not attach sufficient significance
to the codes as governing law. Lower court judges rarely would
disobey a recent supreme court opinion setting forth a legal
doctrine. Yet, in issuing supervisory rulings and presiding over
cases involving civil or criminal law regulating lawyers, the trial bench routinely treats the adoption of the professional code
as less relevant, or less binding, than other supreme court legal
decisions.132
In treating the professional codes as, at most, a weak form
of law, the lower courts assume that the codes deserve minimal
respect. That assumption must stem from one of three beliefs:
(1) that the governing supreme court in fact has not established
the law inherent in the adopted professional code, deferring instead to bar self-regulation; (2) that the supreme court’s own
sense of the code as an aspect of self-regulation renders the
code less valuable or authoritative; or (3) that the code is full
law, but that the supreme court does not intend it to apply outside the disciplinary context.
These three possible beliefs all have the same impact. They
discourage lower courts from making a serious effort to determine how supervisory regimes, substantive law, and disciplinary standards interrelate and should be reconciled. This, in
turn, produces inconsistent decision making among judges who
have varying levels of respect for professional self-regulation,
ultimately leading to inconsistent standards for lawyer behavior. Lawyers are left unable to rely on the professional codes

131. See id. (discussing state supreme courts’ coordinating function).
132. See id. (manuscript at 82–83) (describing lower courts’ reactions to
professional standards).
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as guidance for their behavior because even compliant behavior
may leave them subject to civil liability or judicial sanction.133
In substance, a lower court’s belief that the code is not intended as controlling law, even in situations in which its terms
seem to apply, justifies the court in downplaying the normative
force of the rules. Particularly where the professional rules delegate matters to lawyer discretion, the court may assume that
the bar’s “self-regulating” code drafters have accorded discretion either for self-serving reasons or because the drafters could
not achieve consensus regarding the merits.134 In fact, grants of
discretion may be based on legitimate substantive reasons, including lawyers’ superior expertise in making particular decisions or the reality that flexibility is needed in order to address
fact-sensitive issues that are likely to arise.135
Consider, for example, a permissive exception to attorneyclient confidentiality that allows disclosure to prevent harm to
third parties. A trial judge crafting parallel attorney-client privilege law might take the normative suggestions of the confidentiality exception into account, but only if the judge perceives
that the confidentiality exception reflects the supreme court’s
view of the appropriate balance between attorney-client secrecy
and courts’ need to obtain relevant evidence. In contrast, if the
judge perceives the confidentiality rule to be merely the bar’s
self-regulation—readily accepted by the state supreme court
without serious consideration—he is more likely to treat the
permissive exception as an effort by the bar to insulate lawyers
from sanction when they fail to disclose what they should.136
The belief of some lower courts that supreme court oversight is a form of self-regulation, right or wrong, therefore interferes with a reasoned assessment of how the continuing
work of regulating lawyers should be distributed. Trial judges
133. See, e.g., Green v. Nevers, 111 F.3d 1295, 1302 (11th Cir. 1997) (stating that an attorney’s agreed-upon fees are subject to judicial reduction even if
the fees are not “so ‘clearly excessive’ as to justify a finding of breach of ethical
rules” governing the reasonableness of fees (quoting McKenzie Constr., Inc. v.
Maynard, 758 F.2d 97, 100 (3d Cir. 1985))).
134. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 312−14 (noting that permissive rules have greater risk of being self-serving).
135. See id. at 298−312 (discussing potentially legitimate interests underlying permissive rules).
136. See, e.g., Fred C. Zacharias, Harmonizing Privilege and Confidentiality, 41 S. TEX. L. REV. 69, 72−74 (1999) (discussing similar justifications that
underlie attorney-client privilege law and attorney-client confidentiality rules
but noting the courts’ hesitation to harmonize the doctrines because of a sense
that they reflect distinct visions of what is appropriate).
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who do not trust supreme court professional regulation (or assume that the governing supreme court does not intend the
code to be treated as full law) will not defer to the supreme
court’s standards even when, in fact, they represent the supreme court’s considered opinion.137 Nor will the lower courts
attempt to harmonize their regulatory decisions with the codes
and disciplinary law.
C. CONSEQUENCES FOR BAR CODE-DRAFTERS
From the bar’s perspective, the notion of self-regulation
stems from the perception that, because lawyers are most familiar with legal practice, lawyers themselves can best understand the demands upon them and are therefore best qualified
to write the rules governing their conduct. Many commentators
suggest that the bar, through the codes, attempts to press its
separate vision of law and the role of lawyers—one that often is
at odds with the vision of the courts and the state.138 Sometimes the inconsistent professional rules are designed to encourage changes in external law,139 sometimes they are meant
simply to operate in an independent sphere (i.e., professional
discipline),140 and sometimes they reflect pronouncements of
defiance by the bar.141
To the extent that the commentators are correct in their
assessment of the purposes of the code,142 there are a variety of
costs associated with professional rule making that challenges
external law. First, it undermines the function of providing
137. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 58).
138. For a comprehensive discussion of this view, see Susan P. Koniak, The
Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1389, 1391 (1992).
139. See, e.g., Zacharias, supra note 83, at 274−78 (discussing the codes’
function of influencing judicial standards); cf. Green & Zacharias, supra note
26, at 308 (discussing the codes’ function of filling in “gaps in the law”).
140. Thus, for example, professional rules governing attorney-client confidentiality can coexist with judicial evidentiary law governing attorney-client
privilege because the two concepts operate in different spheres—general secrecy versus secrecy in litigation. See Zacharias, supra note 136, at 73–74 (discussing the context and development of the secrecy principles governing attorneys). Nevertheless, the two concepts place very different emphases on the
relative importance of maintaining confidentiality in the attorney-client relationship and the corresponding importance of obtaining evidence that will aid
the truth-seeking process. See id.
141. See Koniak, supra note 138, at 1401 (describing competition between
the bar and the state in their views of the law).
142. But see Zacharias & Green, supra note 38, at 57−60 (offering an alternative to the view that the codes are continually at odds with external law because of the bar’s independent substantive vision).
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lawyers with guidance about how they should act; if the codes
encourage conduct inconsistent with the letter or spirit of judicially enforced rules, lawyers follow the codes at their peril.
Second, rule making that challenges external law undermines
faith in the legitimacy of the rules.143 Third, it makes the rules
less important because it effectively confines their applicability
to the narrow areas in which the codes alone govern.
Because of the process through which the model codes are
adopted, it is difficult to generalize about, or prove the actual
intentions of, the drafters. Although new rules typically are
proposed by a committee, ultimately the whole body of ABA
delegates vote on the proposals, and thus many different approaches inevitably are at play. It is likely, however, that at
least some portion of the approving body typically thinks of the
codes as reflecting the bar’s special insights and hopes to press,
or seek implementation of, the bar’s separate, superior expertise.144
A significant consequence of this approach to selfregulation is that it perpetuates the view that external regulation is an evil to be prevented or minimized. The persistence of
this mindset is evident in the Preamble to the Model Rules.145
Rather than attempting to mesh the professional rules and external law or attempting to build upon external law, the code
drafters remain willing to adopt rules inconsistent with external law, which lawyers then attempt to use as a defense, immunity, or for other personal benefit.
One example was the ABA’s fairly recent promulgation of
rules designed to prevent prosecutors from subpoenaing attorneys to the grand jury.146 The ABA opposed attorney subpoenas
on the basis that they are inconsistent with the bar’s broad
conception of attorney-client confidentiality and the importance
of maintaining attorney-client relationships;147 the subpoe143. See Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 315−18 (suggesting that external lawmakers’ responses to the professional rules reasonably depend on
their view of the purposes of the rules).
144. See, e.g., Thomas G. Bost, Corporate Lawyers After the Big Quake: The
Conceptual Fault Line in the Professional Duty of Confidentiality, 19 GEO. J.
LEGAL ETHICS 1089, 1110−12 (2006) (describing efforts by the ABA to “sidetrack” threatened federal regulation under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act).
145. See supra text accompanying note 15.
146. See generally Stern & Hoffman, supra note 102, at 1789–95, 1820–24
(describing the ABA rule and the surrounding controversy).
147. See Roger C. Cramton & Lisa K. Udell, State Ethics Rules and Federal
Prosecutors: The Controversies over the Anti-Contact and Subpoena Rules, 53
U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 364−67 (1992) (discussing the history of Model Rule
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naing of a defense attorney to testify against his client can chill
the client’s trust in his attorney.148 The reality, however, is that
under common substantive law definitions of attorney-client
privilege, prosecutors often are perfectly justified in subpoenaing attorneys, because information provided by clients for
the purpose of obtaining assistance in criminal activity is legally unprivileged.149 By pressing its vision in the subpoena rules
rather than accepting privilege law as a given, the ABA forfeited the opportunity to promulgate different regulations or
legislative initiatives that might have accommodated the legitimate rights of defendants.150 In the end, the bar’s actual proposals were doomed to failure because they were inconsistent
with external law and courts were unwilling to enforce them.151
This example suggests that viewing professional regulation
as self- rather than co-regulation encourages the bar to act too
independently in its rule making. An explicit effort to mesh the
codes and external law would guide lawyers better, make the
codes more acceptable to external authorities, and harmonize
the law. More importantly, it would help the bar assess the
rules and their potential effect more realistically.
Addressing the rules as co-regulation would also enhance
the efficiency of the codes. One recurring issue is whether and
when maintaining ethics provisions make sense in the absence
of active disciplinary enforcement.152 If the underlying substance of a particular unenforced rule is enforced through pa3.8(f )); Koniak, supra note 138, at 1398−401 (discussing the bar’s justifications
for proposing Model Rule 3.8(f )).
148. See, e.g., Genego, supra note 99, at 874−75 (cataloguing adverse effects of attorney subpoenas).
149. Zacharias, supra note 102, at 930 (“[T]he mere existence of ideals and
standards of conduct in the codes is not a basis for refusing disclosure of information in court.”).
150. See id. at 944−54 (identifying a change to grand jury secrecy rules
that would have accommodated both the bar’s and prosecutors’ concerns).
151. See AM. BAR ASS’N, STANDING COMM. ON ETHICS & PROF ’L RESPONSIBILITY, REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATION TO THE HOUSE OF DELEGATES 7
(1995), reprinted in STEPHEN GILLERS & ROY D. SIMON, JR., REGULATION OF
LAWYERS: STATUTES AND STANDARDS 249−50 (1996) (successfully proposing
deletion of the judicial supervision requirement in Model Rule 3.8(f ) and noting that numerous states’ bars and courts rejected the requirement). The ABA
report proposing deletion noted that the record on Model Rule 3.8(f ) “reflects a
fundamental and widespread doubt about the suitability of Rule 3.8(f ) in its
current form as a rule of ethics, a doubt that the Standing Committee has
come to share.” Id. at 250.
152. For a full discussion of this issue, see Zacharias, supra note 92, at
1005–12.
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rallel external law, that might speak to elimination of the rule
absent an independent reason to keep it;153 ordinarily, perpetuating unenforced provisions undermines their force and lawyers’ respect for the codes.154 Conversely, identifying the guidance provided by external law would inform the bar about
when professional regulation is necessary to fill gaps.
Perhaps more importantly, the misguided perception that
external regulation should be fended off through the promulgation of self-regulatory codes misleads the bar into focusing its
resources inefficiently. There are some aspects of regulation
that bar organizations understand best and do well, others that
the bar might better leave to other institutions. For example,
ethics codes and professional disciplinary processes probably
are not particularly effective mechanisms for regulating illegal
conduct by lawyers; code provisions governing illegality tend to
be unspecific and disciplinary officials typically do not have the
resources required for criminal investigations.155 There is no
legitimate theoretical reason for the bar to discourage or attempt to forestall criminal prosecutions156 because unlawful
conduct is prohibited under the codes as well.
In contrast, the bar is in a relatively good position to establish programs providing assistance for lawyers who engage in
substance abuse. The bar can understand the pressures of a legal career and make itself aware of the extent of the substance
abuse problem in the particular jurisdiction. It can also offer
peer support. Nevertheless, difficulties arise when the bar simultaneously takes upon itself the project of “self-regulating”
the adverse consequences of the behavior of addicted lawyers in
order to fend off outside regulation; regulating those conse153. See Macey, supra note 10, at 1082 (“[T]he legal profession and clients
would benefit from abandoning [self-regulation] for a private contracting model that treats clients as investors to whom lawyers owe standard fiduciary duties of care, loyalty, good faith, and disclosure.”).
154. See Zacharias, supra note 92, at 1016. But see Fred C. Zacharias, Integrity Ethics (forthcoming 2009) (manuscript at 7, 23, 44 –47, on file with author) (discussing situations in which unenforced rules may play a meaningful
role).
155. For example, disciplinary prosecutors may not have access to investigators, grand jury mechanisms, or even subpoena power. See Stern & Hoffman, supra note 102, at 1820–22.
156. Cf. Macey, supra note 10, at 1085 (“[L]awyers benefit from selfgovernance, and thus are loathe to take actions that would make the existence
of unprofessional conduct salient to any administrative authority, as focusing
on incivility could lead to criticism of the very status quo regulatory structure
from which lawyers benefit.”).

2009]

MYTH OF SELF-REGULATION

1183

quences for the benefit of clients can be inconsistent with providing assistance to the regulated lawyers. It might be preferable for the bar to accept external regulation—even, for example,
to the extent of encouraging criminal prosecutors to prosecute
addicted lawyers who abuse their clients’ trust accounts—and
to itself focus on serving the assistance, rather than the regulatory, function.157
Recognizing the interrelationship between professional
codes and external law can also lead the bar to engage in cooperative endeavors that will help lawyers comply with external
law in a way disciplinary codes cannot. For example, analyzing
the S&L scandals of the 1980s, Ted Schneyer finds that the unspecific nature of many ethics provisions applicable to banking
lawyers, while justifiable as encouraging lawyer introspection,
provided neither a basis for discipline nor adequate guidance
concerning how to act.158 At the same time, their ambiguity
opened the door to aggressive agency regulation of lawyers.159
Schneyer suggests that a realistic assessment of the interrelationship between the codes and external law should prompt the
bar to participate in developing protocols independent of the
codes in order to guide future banking lawyers’ behavior; this
would best enable banking lawyers to comport with the obligations of external regulation while acting in a professional manner.160 Such an approach is only possible, however, if the bar
recognizes the limitations of the ethics codes, the functions alternative to code-drafting that the bar can serve, and the value
of acting cooperatively as a co-regulator with courts, agencies,
and legislatures.
In short, perceiving the role of the professional codes unrealistically as a regulatory regime that should operate in the
place of external regulation can cause the bar to err in the rules
it includes, the way it writes its rules, and the focus of its operations. Conversely, recognizing the professional codes as co157. See Zacharias, supra note 26, at 28 (“[T]he bar may need to withdraw
somewhat from regulating and disciplining lawyers with respect to human
vices, concentrate on education and treatment efforts, and emphasize nonprofessional remedies for clients who are injured by the behavior of affected lawyers.”).
158. See Schneyer, supra note 16, at 650–51, 666−68.
159. See id. at 666 (“[T]he bar’s vague ethics rules have proven to have
huge and unexpected in terrorem effects.”).
160. See id. at 672−73; cf. Deborah L. Rhode & Paul D. Paton, Lawyers,
Ethics, and Enron, 8 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 9, 33 (2002) (urging the bar to regulate “cooperatively”).
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regulation would help the bar tailor its regulatory endeavors to
gaps in the law and to forms of behavior that the bar, and the
professional disciplinary process, is particularly well-suited to
regulating. Overall, meshing the codes with external law can
lead to a clearer regulatory regime and better guidance for lawyers. It also would maximize the bar’s resources by avoiding
duplicative regulation.
D. CONSEQUENCES FOR LAWYERS
This Article has already noted the main consequence of the
persistent image of self-regulation for lawyers themselves.161
Self-regulation creates questions about the nature of the professional codes as binding law, thereby undermining the value
of the codes in providing guidance.162 At one level, if lawyers
conceptualize the codes as self-regulation, they may feel freer to
disagree or disobey the codes, particularly when the drafters
have expressed their vision of appropriate conduct through hortatory or discretionary rules.163 After all, the drafters of the
self-regulatory provisions are simply lawyers whose opinion regarding appropriate conduct seems to have no more validity
than the individual lawyers’ own.164
More significantly, to the extent that conceptualizing the
codes as self-regulation encourages supervisory courts to depart
from the standards in the codes,165 lawyers are left in the dark
concerning how they may behave.166 Sometimes the judicial departures simply reflect a refusal to enforce the codes, but leave
the behavioral mandates in the code intact.167 On other occa161. See, e.g., supra note 133 and accompanying text.
162. See supra text accompanying note 132.
163. A grant of discretion in the professional code can, of course, mean
many things ranging from a suggestion that equally legitimate options exist to
a requirement that lawyers act in accordance with the spirit of the rule. See
Green & Zacharias, supra note 26, at 276−87 (discussing competing interpretations of permissive rules).
164. As discussed in Zacharias, supra note 92, at 1005–06, lawyers seem
willing to depart from the mandates of professional rules that they do not believe will be enforced against them. The willingness to depart suggests that
lawyers have a latent readiness to substitute their own calculus for that of the
rule makers.
165. See Zacharias & Green, supra note 4 (manuscript at 80–84) (discussing supervisory courts’ willingness to depart from the code standards).
166. See Leubsdorf, supra note 110 (manuscript at 3) (“The fragmentation
of the law of the legal profession . . . complicates the lives of lawyers.”).
167. See, e.g., Sealed Party v. Sealed Party, No. H-04 -2229, 2006 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 28392, at *68 (S.D. Tex. Apr. 28, 2006) (rejecting a breach of fiduciary
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sions, however, the judicial mandates may be stricter—as, for
example, when a court disqualifies a lawyer with a conflict of
interest despite the fact that the lawyer obtained consent that,
under the prevailing code, seems to authorize the representation.168 The lawyer is left unable to know when he can rely on
the code’s provisions and when he cannot.
This is not to gainsay the salutary effects that the notion of
self-regulation can have. To this point, this Article has alluded
mainly to the potential function of self-regulation in fending off
external oversight of the profession. Self-regulation can, however, be beneficial over a range of practice situations by encouraging lawyers to think about what constitutes appropriate
behavior and to rein in their worst inclinations. Unfortunately,
not all lawyers—some would argue few lawyers—are capable of
such self-control in the face of economic incentives to act for
personal benefit.169 Emphasizing the self-regulatory nature of
professional mandates frees lawyers who disavow introspection
and restraint to read the codes narrowly and to seek loopholes
that authorize self-interested behavior.170
E. CONSEQUENCES FOR LAYPERSONS
For laypersons, the primary consequence of the myth that
lawyers control their own regulation is one of perception. Laypersons assume that the bar self-regulates in a self-serving
way.171 Likewise, they assume that rules which produce superclaim arising from a lawyer’s disclosure of client confidences because the client
was not damaged by the disclosure).
168. See, e.g., State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 755 (Utah 2003) (noting
criminal court judges’ authority to reject clients’ waivers of conflicts of interest
and to disqualify clients’ choice of counsel).
169. Jonathan Macey argues that with the decline of the bar’s monopoly
power, self-regulation by the bar has become “an idea whose time has gone.”
Macey, supra note 10, at 1094, 1096. Macey suggests that, because sanctions
are ineffective, lawyers no longer fear enforcement of the bar’s standards, and
that acting in self-interested and unprofessional ways therefore has become an
efficient approach. See id. at 1094 –96.
170. Cf. David McGowan, Why Not Try the Carrot? A Modest Proposal to
Grant Immunity to Lawyers Who Disclose Client Financial Misconduct, 92
CAL. L. REV. 1825, 1825 n.1 (2004) (suggesting that lawyers will universally
apply discretionary confidentiality exceptions in the way that maximizes their
self-interest).
171. See Fred C. Zacharias, The Purposes of Lawyer Discipline, 45 WM. &
MARY L. REV. 675, 715 (2003) (“Excusing rule violations, even well-intended
rule violations, . . . risks sending the public a message that the professional
standards will not be enforced when an accused lawyer offers an arguable
excuse for a violation.” (footnote omitted)).

1186

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[93:1147

ficially unpleasant results for society—including rules requiring zealous representation of guilty defendants and the maintenance of unpleasant confidences—do so because lawyers derive a benefit therefrom, rather than because the rules serve
important systemic functions.172
Equally important, the perception that the profession is
self-regulated through bar associations, rather than coregulated, causes laypersons to ascribe either too much or the
wrong significance to the disciplinary process. Professional discipline serves many functions, of which punishment of the lawyer may be the least important.173 Particularly when a lawyer
is punished for bad conduct through alternative means—for example criminal or civil liability—disciplinary authorities may
focus on the licensing function: determining whether the lawyer is able to represent future clients well.174 Laypersons who
perceive discipline as the sum total of lawyer regulation become
discouraged when conduct that may be inappropriate in one
sense does not lead to professional sanctions.175 This in turn
can produce distrust in the legal system and in the integrity of
the bar as a whole.176
Perhaps the best example of the dilemma for disciplinary
regulators is, again, the issue of substance abuse by attorneys.
Consider an attorney who, because of an addiction, has served
past clients poorly. But assume further that the lawyer has undergone treatment, is fully rehabilitated, and poses no further
threat of inadequate representation. A disciplinary board judging whether this lawyer is fit to practice law in the future
might well decide that he is. Lay observers, however, would
perceive this decision as reflecting lawyers protecting their
own. Only if the disciplinary authorities can plausibly point to
other forms of regulation that punish or remedy the lawyer’s
past misconduct—including malpractice, breach of fiduciary
172. See id. at 725–26, 726 n.186.
173. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 232 (“What is needed is to
remove the fault notion from the process of professional self-regulation.”); Zacharias, supra note 171, 680, 680–82 (discussing the various goals of professional discipline, including punishment).
174. See Zacharias, supra note 171, at 684.
175. See Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at 234−35 (“The present disciplinary approach fosters a belief on the part of the public that incompetent lawyers are weeded out and that lawyers who remain certified are competent. . . .
[T]he implication of self-regulation without the reality of self-regulation has
unfortunate consequences.”).
176. See id.
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duty, or criminal177 law—can the authorities hope to persuade
lay observers of the integrity of the disciplinary system. The
regulators must be able to make clear that the lawyer regulatory regime is one of co- rather than self-regulation.
IV. A PROPOSAL TO AMEND THE MODEL RULES
The upshot of this Article’s analysis is that all parts of the
American legal profession should embrace the notion that professional standards of behavior are only one aspect of a multipronged scheme of lawyer regulation. A prudent first step towards acknowledging this reality would be an amendment to
the portion of the Preamble to the ABA’s Model Rules that
equates the codes to self-regulation. The amendment should
exorcize all reference to self-regulation and, in place of that notion, should emphasize the role of the professional code in the
broader regulatory regime.
Paragraphs ten, eleven, and the first half of twelve of the
Preamble therefore might be replaced with the following
statement:
The legal profession is heavily regulated. It is regulated simultaneously by state supreme courts promulgating and administering disciplinary rules, courts supervising lawyers in individual cases, administrative agencies setting standards for lawyers appearing before
them, and civil and criminal law. Law sometimes is referred to as a
self-regulating profession, but that is primarily because lawyers participate in the process of setting the governing standards through
their involvement in professional committees and as litigating attorneys who raise ethical issues about their adversaries.
The fact that the regulation of lawyers is shared among several
regulators has consequences. In their practices, lawyers should not
assume that one form of regulation is exclusive. Lawyers should act
with respect for their roles as advocates for clients and as participants
in the legal system, but should also be prepared to follow universal
principals of law and morality when the special requirements of their
roles do not mandate different conduct. The mandates of the professional code often are also interrelated with the mandates of external
law; lawyers, code drafters, courts, and other regulators should attempt to reconcile those mandates where possible. To the extent that
lawyers simultaneously meet the obligations of their profession as defined in the disciplinary rules, other legal requirements, and moral
imperatives, the occasion for increased regulation will be obviated.

These paragraphs, for the first time in the professional
codes, would highlight the existence of external law regulating
177. In the substance abuse context, for example, criminal law might apply
if the lawyer misappropriated client funds to pay for his addiction. See Zacharias, supra note 171, at 678, 680–81.
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lawyers and acknowledge the interrelationship between the
various forms of regulation. They are designed to guide lawyers
by dispelling the misperception that obedience to the code immunizes behavior from sanction and by encouraging lawyers to
look to universal principles of morality and external law.
The Model Rules are directed primarily at attorneys. The
proposed amendment to the Preamble is designed to make clear
to the bar the importance of understanding external regulation.
One sentence of the proposal, however, is directed at the regulators, urging them to confront the interrelationship of external
law and the codes and to attempt to harmonize them when
possible. As discussed above, many of the adverse consequences
arising from the myth of self-regulation result from the failure
of the regulators to acknowledge the fact that the codes, when
adopted, become law. The proposal encourages a change in this
practice.
The proposal does not attempt to identify the precise functions bar regulators should serve, or subjects they should avoid
addressing, when promulgating professional rules. Previously,
this Article concluded that the drafters might fruitfully eliminate professional mandates in at least some situations in which
external regulation exists or represents a superior approach to
the targeted conduct.178 Simultaneously, the Article suggested
that the bar should focus its resources on projects for which it
is well suited and should encourage external regulators to act
in those areas which fit their expertise.179 These approaches
should develop by themselves as soon as the bar and external
regulators come to grips with the interrelationship of the codes
and external law. The above proposal therefore confines itself
to a limited change that will help bring this recognition about.
CONCLUSION
Whatever its actual meaning, the term “self-regulation”
produces an image of lawyers unilaterally controlling the behavior of their peers. That image is patently false. At best, the bar
sets standards for its members that sometimes are followed
and sometimes are enforced. At worst, the standards fail to address key issues and are honored in the breach. In reality, consumers of legal services who are injured, or potentially injured,
by lawyer misconduct have recourse to civil remedies, statutory
178. See supra text accompanying note 153.
179. See supra notes 155−57 and accompanying text.
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protections, and judicial regulation of lawyers that may mesh
with, but often set standards that go well beyond, the mandates
of professional codes.
As this Article has discussed, however, the persistence of
the image of self-regulation and the continued use of the term
has consequences for the way lawyers, external regulators, and
consumers perceive the bar and implement alternative regulation. The ABA’s purported goals of self-regulation—fostering a
complete regime of appropriate lawyer behavior and forestalling external regulation—have proven unrealistic. Pursuing
these goals arguably has undermined the effectiveness of the
ABA’s and state bar organizations’ code-drafting projects and
the readiness of bar organizations to welcome external regulation in a way that would allow them to attend to other functions that only they can accomplish.
To some extent, the problems this Article has addressed
are prompted by the semantic issue of how code-drafting efforts
of the bar and disciplinary processes should be characterized,
or thought about.180 No one would suggest that efforts by the
bar to adopt standards of conduct or to encourage moral introspection on the part of lawyers are a bad thing. Nor would even
the most critical observers be inclined to eliminate professional
discipline as a possible consequence for misbehaving lawyers;
the potential for sanctions, including suspension or disbarment,
needs to be inherent in any state-sanctioned regime that licenses professionals and thereby creates barriers to entry into
the profession. And, to the extent that the bar, state supreme
courts, or lawyer-judges implement standards that tilt unfairly
in the direction of lawyer self-interest, criticism of their regulation is justified.
Continued use of the misleading term “self-regulation,”
however, muddies the conceptual dividing line between lawyer
self-restraint, professional codes that guide and monitor lawyers, and judicially controlled discipline of the bar. It may well
be, as some have suggested, that existing disciplinary processes
are ineffective, misguided, or inadequately staffed and supported.181 If so, that should prompt direct inquiry into those is180. The semantic issue is discussed in Fred C. Zacharias, The “SelfRegulation” Misnomer, in REAFFIRMING LEGAL ETHICS: TAKING STOCK AND
NEW IDEAS (Reid Mortensen et al. eds.) (forthcoming 2009) (on file with author).
181. See generally CLARK REPORT, supra note 64, at 19, 24, 67, 97 (discussing the problems in disciplinary agencies); RHODE, supra note 88, at 158–61
(describing disciplinary enforcement problems including inefficiencies, secre-
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sues, together with consideration of whether judicial control of
the disciplinary process should be replaced with alternative
mechanisms of lawyer regulation. Those issues become secondary when conceived as aspects of lawyer self-regulation, because lawyers as a group neither control the process nor are the
cause of the failings that may be present.
This Article therefore has proposed an appropriate semantic solution. It encourages all participants in the lawyerregulatory process to abandon the misnomer “self-regulation,”
and to replace the term with honest substitutes, such as “coregulation.” The proposed amendment to the Model Rules
would be a first, symbolic change in this direction. The hard
work that must follow—eliminating misguided or inherently
self-serving regulation where it exists, distributing the work of
regulating lawyers, and harmonizing and fleshing out the various forms of co-regulation to produce an effective regulatory regime—are projects for another day.

tiveness, and inadequate punishment); Marks & Cathcart, supra note 22, at
193–96, 206–21 (discussing the existing disciplinary problems with selfregulation).

